THE FIVE REALLY BIG VALUATION ISSUES

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S: Lucy/Schroeder

2014 AICPA/AAML National Conference on Divorce



Context for Discussing Big Issues

BVS-VII Valuation Discounts and Premiums

- II. The concepts of discounts and premiums
 - A. A discount has no meaning until the <u>conceptual basis underlying the</u> <u>base value</u> to which it is applied <u>is defined</u>.
 - B. A premium has no meaning until the <u>conceptual basis underlying the</u> <u>base value</u> to which it is applied <u>is defined</u>.
 - C. A discount or premium is warranted when <u>characteristics</u> affecting the value of the subject interest <u>differ sufficiently</u> from those inherent in the base value to which the discount or premium is applied.
 - D. A discount or premium quantifies an adjustment to account for <u>differences</u> <u>in characteristics</u> affecting the value of the subject interest <u>relative to the base value</u> to which it is compared.

Source: American Society of Appraisers, 2009 ASA Business Valuation Standards

N: The Biggest Issue



The Biggest Issue

Understanding what drives valuation of an asset (always expected cash flow, expected growth of the cash flows, and the expected risk of achieving them)

from the viewpoint of the relevant
(hypothetical or real) buyers and sellers in
the market(s) for the asset (i.e., relevant
market participants)

and in the context of the relevant
standard of value (fair market value, fair
value, investment value, other)

N: Gordon Model



The Gordon Growth Model

$$\mathbf{V_o} = \frac{\mathbf{CF_1}}{\mathbf{r} - \mathbf{g}}$$

N: General Valuation Model



General Valuation Model

- Value = CF * 1/(r g)
- Value = CF * M

N: DCF



Definition of Enterprise Value / DCF

Value =
$$V_0 = \left[\frac{CF_1}{(1+r)^1} + \frac{CF_2}{(1+r)^2} + \frac{CF_3}{(1+r)^3} + \frac{CF_4}{(1+r)^4} + ... + \frac{CF_n}{(1+r)^n} \right]$$



General Valuation Model (Enterprise)

Value =
$$V_0 = \frac{CF_1}{(1+r)^1} + \frac{CF_2}{(1+r)^2} + ... + \frac{CF_n}{(1+r)^n} = V_0 = \frac{CF_1}{(r-g)}$$

- If all cash flows are reinvested in the business at "r" (or all cash flows are distributed)
- and if CF grows at a constant rate of "g"

N: Two-Stage DCF



Two Stage DCF Model (Enterprise)

Finite Forecast Period

$$V_0 = \frac{CF_1}{(1+r)^1} + \frac{CF_2}{(1+r)^2} + ... + \frac{CF_f}{(1+r)^f} + \frac{CF_{f+1}/r - g}{(1+r)^f}$$

- Present value of expected cash flows for a finite number of years (i.e., for a discrete forecast period)
- Plus: Present value of all remaining cash flows at the end of the discrete forecast period

N: Shareholder Level DCF

Terminal Value



Shareholder Level DCF

| DCF | Shareholder-Level DCF |
|--------------------------------------|-----------------------|
| Probable Future Economic Benefits | 1. G _V |
| | 2. D _% |
| | 3. G _{D%} |
| | 4. Holding Period |
| Discount Rate | 5. R _{HP} |

Perpetuity Concept

Finite Expected Holding Period

Enterprise Concept

Portion of Enterprise




Nonmarketable Minority Level of Value

$$V_{SH} = \frac{CF_{SH}}{R_{HP} - G_{V}}$$

- \bullet $CF_{SH} \leq CF_{E}$
- $R_{HP} > R_{F}$

N: Valuation funnel





Relevant Buyers

Strategic buyers

Public companies Private companies P/E groups

Financial buyers

Public companies
Private companies
P/E groups

Minority interest buyers

Institutions P/E groups Companies Individuals

N: FMV



Fair Market Value Defined

Glossary ASA Business Valuation Standards

The price, expressed in terms of cash equivalents, at which property would change hands between a hypothetical willing and able buyer and a hypothetical willing and able seller, acting at arm's length in an open and unrestricted market, when neither is under compulsion to buy or sell and when both have reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts.

Use this definition to help you in making key valuation decisions

Relevant Standard of Value



Fair Market Value

Hypothetical

WB

WS

2 x Informed

2 x No Compulsion

2 x Capacity

Hypothetical Transaction

Relevant Standard of Value



Fair Market Value

- Arms' length standard of value
- Represents hypothetical negotiations between hypothetical parties
- Reflective of rational thinking
- Responsive to market information
- Valuations should be defined in terms descriptive of behavior of market participants
- Estate of Verna Mae Crosby
 - Tax matter involving fair market value of promissory note
 - Use of definition and implications of fair market value won the day for the taxpayer

N: Integrated theory

Relevant Standard of Value



Expected Cash Flow, Risk, and Growth Determine the Level of Value

| | Conceptual Math | Relationships | Value Implications |
|---------------------------------|--|---|--|
| Strategic Control Value | $\frac{CF_{e(c,s)}}{R_s - [G_{mm} + G_s]}$ | $\begin{array}{c} CF_{e(c,s)} \geq CF_{e(c,f)} \\ G_s \geq 0 \\ R_s \leq R_mm \end{array}$ | $V_{e(c,s)} \ge V_{e(c,f)}$ |
| Financial Control Value | $\frac{CF_{e(c,f)}}{R_{f} - [G_{mm} + G_{f}]}$ | $CF_{e(c,f)} \ge CF_{e(mm)}$ $G_f \ge 0$ $R_f = R_{mm} (+/- a little)$ | $V_{e(c,f)} \ge V_{mm}$ |
| Marketable Minority Value | CF _{e(mm)} R _{mm} - G _{mm} | $G_v = R_{mm} - Div Yld$ | V _{mm} is the benchmark for the other levels |
| Nonmarketable Minority Value | CF _{sh} R _{hp} - G _v | $CF_{sh} \leq CF_{e(mm)}$ $G_{v} \leq R_{mm} - DivYId$ $R_{hp} \geq R_{mm}$ | V _{sh} ≤ V _{mm} |

Exhibit 4.1: Business Valuation: An Integrated Theory, 2nd Edition

N: Context again

Context for Discussing Big Issues

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Source: American Society of Appraisers, 2009 ASA Business Valuation Standards

N: Levels of value




Levels of Value

TRADITIONAL



UPDATED





N: Big Issues



The Five Really Big Issues

- 1. Discount Rates (Risk)
- 2. Control Premiums and Minority Interest Discounts (Cash Flow)
- 3. Adjustments to the Income Statement (Cash Flow)
- 4. Guideline Public Company Method and the Guideline Transactions Method
- 5. Fundamental Adjustments (Cash Flow, Risk, Growth)
- Marketability Discounts



Issue One **Discount Rates**

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Discount Rates



Models

- CAPM
- Modified CAPM (MCAPM)
- Adjusted CAPM (ACAPM)
- Build-Up
- Duff & Phelps
- Butler Pinkerton Total Beta
- Implied Private Company Pricing Model (IPCPM)
- Others

Components

- Treasuries
 - Nominal
 - Normalized
- ERP
- Beta
- Size premium
- Specific company risk
- Volatility of earnings, etc.
- Total beta
- Industry risk premiums



Discount Rates

The Big Problem with discount rates is that appraisers get focused on their models and model components to the exclusion of recognizing that any subject asset discount rate must make sense in the context of the relevant market for the subject asset



N: Sensitivity



Discount Rate Sensitivity

| Discount Rate Components | | Appraiser 1 | Appraiser 2 | Appraiser 3 |
|--------------------------------------|------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Risk-Free Rate | RFR | 5.0% | 5.0% | 5.0% |
| Large Stock Premium | LSP | 4.0% | 5.0% | 6.0% |
| Beta | β | 0.9 | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| Beta-Adjusted Large Stock Premium | | 3.6% | 5.0% | 6.6% |
| Small Stock Premium | SSP | 2.0% | 3.5% | 5.0% |
| Specific Company Risk | SCR | 2.0% | 3.0% | 4.0% |
| Estimated Discount Rate | R | 12.6% | 16.5% | 20.6% |
| less: Estimated Core Earnings Growth | G_{e} | 4.0% | 4.0% | 4.0% |
| Estimated Capitalization Rate | | 8.6% | 12.5% | 16.6% |
| Implied Earnings Multiple | P/E | 11.6 | 8.0 | 6.0 |

Exhibit 6.2 from Business Valuation: An Integrated Theory, 2nd Edition

Which appraiser has the most reasonable discount rate?



Discount Rates

Terminal Value Using Gordon Model

WACC (r) 11.0% Long-term g - 5.0% -------6.0%

1 / (r - g) 16.7x applicable to NCF

- Reasonable or not?
- Terminal growth too high? Nothing grows at 5% forever?
- Implied EBITDA multiple is 9.0x when the current public company median multiple is 9.5x and transaction multiples are double digit. Reasonable or not?
- Gordon Model or Market Multiples for Terminal Value?

N: Discount rate relationships

Discount Rate Relationships

| R Strategic Buyers | < | R Financial Buyers |
|--------------------|----------|------------------------------|
| R Financial Buyers | <u> </u> | R Public Co |
| R Public Co | < | R Illiquid Minority Investor |

Relevant Buyers

Strategic buyers

Public companies Private companies P/E groups

Financial buyers

Public companies
Private companies
P/E groups

Minority interest buyers

Institutions
P/E groups
Companies
Individuals

N: Issue 2, CP and MID



Control Premiums and Minority Interest Discounts

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
Control Premiums & Minority Interest Discounts


- If a strategic control level of value is appropriate, the use of CP added to a marketable minority value is inaccurate, unartful, inadequate, and almost certainly irrelevant
- If a nonmarketable minority level of value is appropriate, the use of
 (1 1/(1+CP) = MID) is inaccurate,
 inadequate, and almost certainly
 overstates any applicable MID
- 2a. No one pays for the so-called "prerogatives of control"

N: Levels of value



Levels of Value





N: Results, not drivers



Control Premiums

Reflect Valuation Results - Not Valuation Drivers

- A control premium (CP) is observed when a public company is acquired at a price in excess of its pre-announcement, freely traded price – it only measures a relationship between two prices
- The announced acquisition price of a public enterprise, or control value (CV) can be shown as a function of its marketable minority, or pre-announcement value (MMV) as:

$$CP = (CV / MMV) - 1$$

$$CV = MMV * (1 + CP)$$

Value = f(Expected Cash Flow, Risk, and Growth)



Control Premiums

Valuation Results, Not Drivers

 Prior to the announcement, marketable minority value reflected a given multiple of stand-alone, normalized earnings (or Earnings_n)

$$CV = (Earnings_n * M) * (1 + CP)$$

MMV

M = f(Cash flow, Risk)

Earnings = Expected Cash Flow, Growth



Control PremiumsValuation Results, Not Drivers

- The control value can also be expressed in terms of the control buyer's earnings expectation. Control values are based on expected earning power from the viewpoint of prospective acquirers, where the earning power is the level of earnings expected post-acquisition based on economies or synergies available to that purchaser (Earnings_c)
- The announced control value can also be expressed, from the viewpoint of the acquirer, as:

$$CV = Earnings_c * M_c$$

Inclusive of expected synergies



Control PremiumsValuation Results, Not Drivers

Combining these two expressions yields the following:

$$(Earnings_n * M) * (1 + CP) = Earnings_c * M$$

MMV No synergies; stand-alone Inclusive of expected synergies


This expression clarifies that the control premium relates two expressions of value, the public market price on the left side of the equation and the announced acquisition price on the right. Observed control premiums are not value drivers – rather they reflect the valuation result of underlying economic and financial factors. Appraisers should be very careful in applying control premiums, particularly larges ones, in valuations



Control Premiums

Valuation Results, Not Drivers

Finally, if we assume that the acquirer's discount rate and growth expectations (embedded in M) are the same as the market discount rate for the public company, the relationship can be simplified to the following:



Control PremiumsValuation Results, Not Drivers

- Control Premiums or Valuation Multiples?
- Observed control premiums represent the net expected synergies/strategic benefits for winning bidder extracted by sellers

So-Called "Prerogatives of Control"


- Appoint or change operational management
- Appoint or change members of the board of directors
- Determine management compensation and perguisites
- Set operational and strategic policy and change the course of the business
- Acquire, lease, or liquidate business assets, including plant, property, and equipment
- Select suppliers, vendors, and subcontractors with whom to do business and award contracts
- Negotiate and consummate mergers and acquisitions
- Liquidate, dissolve, sell out, or recapitalize the company
- Sell or acquire treasury shares
- Register the company's equity securities for an initial or secondary public offering
- Register the company's debt securities for an initial or secondary public offering


- Declare and pay cash and/or stock dividends
- Change the articles of incorporation or bylaws
- Set one's own compensation (and perquisites) and the compensation (and perquisites) of related-party employees
- Select joint venturers and enter into joint venture and partnership agreements
- Decide what products and/or services to offer and how to price those products or services
- Decide what markets and locations to serve, to enter into, and to discontinue serving
- Decide which customer categories to market to and which not to market to
- Enter into inbound and outbound license or sharing agreements regarding intellectual properties
- Block any or all of the above actions

S: Nath hypothesis



Levels of Value





N: MID

Minority Interest Discount

Traditionally thought of as

$$MID = 1 - \frac{1}{Control Value}$$

$$= 1 - \frac{1}{(1 + CP)}$$

If CP includes synergies, MID overstated maybe hugely Synergies have nothing to do with prerogatives of control

N: Wrap-up MID, CP

Minority Interest Discounts Using Control Premium Data

Just Don't Do It!



- Overstates
- Not theoretically or practically realistic
- Most market evidence suggests that MID is small or quite small or nonexistent

Control Premiums to Develop Strategic Control Values

Recommend not using



- V = f (Expected Cash Flow, Risk, and Growth)
 - Develop value directly
- CP embodies none of these economic metrics
- Small, judgmental CP to achieve Financial Control Level of Value?
 Maybe

Issue Three Adjustments to the Income Statement

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Adjustments to the Earnings Stream

1. Minority interest valuations

Failure to normalize the income statement "because the minority shareholder lacks the power to force the adjustment"

 Understanding the difference between normalizing adjustments and "true" control adjustments

Relevant Buyers in the Market / Expected Cash Flows, Risk, and Growth



First Step

Adjustments to the Earnings Stream

- Normalizing Adjustments
 - To adjust privateco earnings to well-run publicco equivalent
 - Not "control" adjustments
 - Not a "facts and circumstances" judgment call
- Repeat after me
 - "Normalizing adjustments are not _____
- Repeat after me




- Adjust the income statement to show the prospective purchaser the return from "normal" operations of the business
- Reveal "public equivalent" income stream




Two kinds of normalizing adjustments

| Type 1 | Eliminate one-time gains or losses, other unusual items, non-recurring business elements, adjust for expenses of non-operating assets, and the like |
|--------|--|
| Type 2 | Normalize officer/owner compensation to levels of comparable companies and adjust for other discretionary expenses that likely would not exist in a well-run publico |

Levels of Value





- Reveal income stream that is source of POTENTIAL VALUE for buyer of minority interests (who must make investment decisions regarding if, when and how future value will be realized)
- Compensation adjustments to normalize owner salaries are not, not, control adjustments
- Repeat after me
- What is the resulting base value if normalizing adjustments are <u>not applied?</u>
- Explain what level of value it is it is not marketable minority!
- Beginning mantra: "No valuation premium or discount..."



- Reveal income stream that would be capitalized if there were an active public market
- Reveal income stream available to controlling interest buyer (who will gain control over income stream) and who may be able to adjust further with own control adjustments




- Some appraisers believe Type 2 normalizing adjustments should not be made in minority interest valuations where interest conveys no control
 - Don't be confused by fact that minority shareholders of privatecos lack control to make normalizing adjustments. Minority shareholders of publicos lack control as well. They EXPECT "normalized" operations or else they walk away
 - Public shareholders have the "power" of marketability
 - Minority shareholders do not have this "power," and therefore offer lower prices if expected cash flows are less than enterprise cash flows and if expected holding period risks are greater than enterprise risks
 - They still need to understand enterprise value before investing!




- If an appraiser fails to make Type 2 normalizing adjustments, earnings potential (& value potential) of subject company are not revealed
- Gift/estate tax example illustrates problems with failure to make
 Type 2 adjustments in minority interest appraisal
 - Gifting shareholder [Divorcing Owner] has current benefit of non-normalized compensation
 - AND benefit of lower taxes on gift [Value for Divorce Purposes]
 - Too good to be true?
- Divorce example
 - [See above]



Levels of Value





Expected Cash Flows, Risk, and Growth



Control Adjustments

- Financial Control Adjustments
 - Run the company better
- Strategic Control Adjustments
 - Run the company differently

Issue Four Guideline Public Company Method and Guideline Transactions Method

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Guideline Public Company Method

- 1. Information issues
- Selecting the appropriate multiples in relationship to medians / averages

Guideline Transactions Method

- Information issues create difficulties
- 2. Selecting the appropriate multiple

Expected Cash Flows, Risk, and Growth



Guideline Public Companies are Companies

SBVS-1 Guideline Public Company Method

II. c. Guideline public companies are companies with shares traded in the public securities markets that provide a reasonable basis for comparison to the investment characteristics of the company (or other interest) being valued. Ideal guideline companies are in the same industry as the subject company; however, if there is insufficient market evidence available in that industry, it may be necessary to select other companies having an underlying similarity to the subject company in terms of relevant investment characteristics such as markets, products, growth, cyclical variability, and other relevant factors

Source: American Society of Appraisers, 2009 ASA Business Valuation Standards



Guideline Public Group

| | | _ | MARKET PRICING ANALYSIS | | | | | | | | | | |
|----------------------------------|--------|-----------|-------------------------|-------------------|--|-----------------------------|-----------------|------------------------------------|--|--|------|--|--|
| | | _ | | | | | Summ | ary Financial Da | ta | | | | |
| | Ticker | Exchange | Sales (\$Mil) | Equity (\$Mil) | Interest Bearing Debt/ Equity | Pre-Tax Profit Margin | ROE (common) | Equity Market Cap (\$Mil) | 1 year ago Equity Market Cap (\$Mil) | 1 year Change Market Cap (%) | Beta | Interest Bearing Debt \$(Mil) | Market Value of Total Cap \$(Mil) |
| Advisory Board Co/The | ABCO | NASDAQ GS | 351.84 | 194.66 | 0.0% | 10.2% | 11.4% | 1,214.90 | 761.36 | 60% | 0.69 | 0.00 | 1,215.59 |
| Corporate Executive Board Co/The | EXBD | New York | 488.88 | 79.56 | 0.0% | 19.1% | 66.2% | 1,268.52 | 1,324.49 | -4% | 1.02 | 0.00 | 1,269.54 |
| CRA International Inc | CRAI | NASDAQ GS | 306.12 | 266.99 | 0.8% | 8.0% | 5.3% | 207.51 | 251.39 | -17% | 0.82 | 2.26 | 210.58 |
| Duff & Phelps Corp | DUF | New York | 396.95 | 278.81 | 0.0% | 11.0% | 6.7% | 610.94 | 690.41 | -12% | 1.13 | 0.00 | 610.94 |
| Huron Consulting Group Inc | HURN | NASDAQ GS | 661.57 | 387.12 | 60.4% | 3.6% | 2.6% | 897.09 | 589.17 | 52% | 0.89 | 233.75 | 1,130.84 |
| Korn/Ferry International | KFY | New York | 824.46 | 609.13 | 0.0% | 12.0% | 10.6% | 814.72 | 1,103.11 | -26% | 1.31 | 0.00 | 816.03 |
| MAXIMUS Inc | MMS | New York | 955.12 | 391.92 | 0.4% | 13.2% | 20.8% | 1,395.02 | 1,149.16 | 21% | 0.85 | 1.72 | 1,397.59 |
| National Research Corp | NRCI | NASDAQ GM | 75.77 | 55.55 | 3.3% | 24.0% | 20.8% | 260.95 | 232.73 | 12% | 0.90 | 1.86 | 262.81 |
| Navigant Consulting Inc | NCI | New York | 784.68 | 513.68 | 25.7% | 9.0% | 8.0% | 596.51 | 478.31 | 25% | 0.67 | 131.79 | 728.97 |
| | | _ | | | | | | | | | | | |
| AVERAGE | | _ | 538.38 | 308.60 | 10.1% | 12.2% | 16.9% | 807.35 | 731.13 | 12.3% | 0.92 | | 849.21 |
| MEDIAN | | _ | 488.88 | 278.81 | 0.4% | 11.0% | 10.6% | 814.72 | 690.41 | 12.1% | 0.89 | | 816.03 |
| CLIENT, INC. | | | 303.23 | 71.15 | 66.3% | 16.9% | 47.8% | \$460.56 | \$383.30 | 20% | | 47.17 | \$507.73 |



Guideline Public Transactions are Transactions

SBVS-2 Guideline Transactions Method

II. C. Guideline transactions are transactions involving companies (or interests) that provide a reasonable basis for *comparison to the* investment characteristics of the company (or interest) being valued. Ideal guideline transactions are in the same industry as the subject company. However, if there is insufficient transactional information available in that industry, it may be necessary to select transactions involving other companies having an *underlying similarity* to the subject company in terms of *relevant investment characteristics* such as markets, products, growth, cyclical variability and other *relevant factors*. Prior transactions in the company being valued may also be considered to be guideline transactions

Source: American Society of Appraisers, 2009 ASA Business Valuation Standards



Guideline Transactions Group

EXHIBIT T
ANALYSIS OF MARKET TRANSACTIONS

| | | Target Finan | ial Data | | | Deal V | aluation | |
|--|-----------------|--------------|----------|----------|------|---------|------------|--------|
| | Assets under | | | Net | | Announ | ce Price / | |
| | Mgmt. | Revenue | EBITDA | Income | | | | Net |
| Buyer / Seller | (\$000s) | (\$000s) | (\$000s) | (\$000s) | AUM | Revenue | EBITDA | Income |
| Apollo Global Management, LLC/ Stone Tower Capital | 18,700,000 | NA | NA | NA | 1.42 | NA | NA | NA |
| Affiliated Managers Group, Inc./ Yacktman Asset Management Co. | 16,800,000 | NA | NA | NA | 2.24 | NA | NA | NA |
| Affiliated Managers Group, Inc./ Veritable, LP | 11,100,000 | NA | NA | NA | 1.05 | NA | NA | NA |
| Ashmore Group Plc/ Emerging Markets Management, L.L.C. | 9,700,000 | NA | NA | NA | 3.74 | NA | NA | NA |
| Wintrust Financial Corporation/ Great Lakes Advisors, Inc. | 2,400,000 | NA | NA | NA | 0.84 | NA | NA | NA |

Median 1.42



Overview Conclusions re Guideline Transactions and Guideline Public Company Methods

Guideline Public Company Method

- Sufficient relevant information often not available
- Not every private company should be valued at the median of its guideline public company group
- Use with care

Guideline Transactions Method

- Sufficient relevant information often not available
- Consider using as a corroborating method or give relatively low weighting if other more robust methods (DCF) are available
- Use with caution or as a test of reasonableness

N: Issue #5, Fundamental Adjustments



Issue Five

Fundamental Adjustments

(Guideline Public Company: Part II)

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- Adjustments to guideline public company multiples (or guideline transactions) to account for known differences in expected cash flow (and growth) and expected risk
 - Qualitative adjustments are sometimes used
 - Quantitative adjustments are sometimes used
- Any time an appraiser selects a multiple for a private company other than the median (or average) of the guideline transaction or public company group, a fundamental adjustment has been applied

Introducing Fundamental Adjustments

Compare Publico with Privateco Derive Publico Discount Rate and Adjust for Privateco

| Line | Capitalization Rate Components | Publico | Privateco | |
|------|---|------------|-----------|---------------------------------|
| 1 | Base Discount Rate (R) | 15.5% | 15.5% | Derived for Publico |
| 2 | Specific Company Risk (SCR) | 0.0% | 2.0% | Greater risks |
| 3 | Equity Discount Rate (R) | 15.5% | 17.5% | |
| 4 | Expected Growth (G _e) | -9.6% | -7.0% | Slower growth expectations |
| 5 | Capitalization Rate (R - G _e) | 5.9% | 10.5% | |
| 6 | P/E Multiple 1 / (R - G _e) | 17.0 | 9.5 | Lower implied P/E for Privateco |
| | | Observed M | lultiple | |
| 7 | Effective Fundamental Adjustment | | -44.0% | |



Estimate Long-Term Growth Rate of Public Guideline Group
Publico Represents the Median of a Guideline Company Group

| Line | Guideline (Public) Company Growth Analysis | _ | Sources/Comments |
|------|--|----------|-------------------------------|
| 1 | Long-Term Government Bond Yield-to-Maturity | 4.9% | As of March 2003 |
| 2 | Equity Risk Premium | 6.2% | Per Mercer Capital analysis |
| 3 | x Industry Beta | 1.2 | |
| 4 | Beta-Adjusted Common Stock Premium | 7.4% | |
| 5 | + Ibbotson Small Stock (Size) Premium | 3.2% | Per Mercer Capital analysis |
| 6 | = Total Equity Premium | 10.6% | |
| 7 | Industry Discount Rate (required rate of return) | 15.5% | |
| 8 | - Industry P/E and Resulting Cap Rate (1 / P/E) | 17.05.9% | Based on median guideline p/e |
| 9 | = Implied Long-Term Growth Rate for Public Companies | 9.6% | |

Expected Cash Flows, Risk, and Growth



Determine a Fundamental Adjustment
Use the ACAPM to Narrow the Range of Judgment
Privateco in Relationship to Guideline Company Group

| | | | | Step 1 | Step 2 | Step 3 |
|------|---|--------------|-----------|------------|-----------|-----------|
| | | | | Set Risk = | Set G = | GROWTH = |
| | | Medians | Privateco | Privateco | Privateco | Privateco |
| | | for | ACAPM | GROWTH = | RISK = | RISK = |
| Line | Subject Company Analysis | Public Group | Build-up | Public | Public | Privateco |
| 1 | Long-Term Government Bond Yield-to-Maturity | 4.9% | 4.9% | 4.9% | 4.9% | 4.9% |
| 2 | + Total Equity Risk Premium (Line 6 from Exhibit 5.2) | 10.6% | 10.6% | 10.6% | 10.6% | 10.6% |
| 3 | + Specific Company Risk (Size) Premium | 0.0% | 2.0% | 2.0% | 0.0% | 2.0% |
| 4 | = Discount Rate (required rate of return) | 15.5% | 17.5% | 17.5% | 15.5% | 17.5% |
| 5 | - Growth Rate Estimates | -9.6% | -7.0% | -9.6% | -7.0% | -7.0% |
| 6 | = Implied Capitalization Rates | 5.9% | 10.5% | 7.9% | 8.5% | 10.5% |
| 7 | Implied P/E Multiples | 17.0 | 9.5 | 12.7 | 11.8 | 9.5 |
| 8 | Implied Adjustment from Guideline Median P/E | na | | -25.4% | -30.8% | -44.0% |

9 Step 4: Selected Fundamental Adjustment

-35.0%



Application of Fundamental Adjustments to Total Capital and Equity Value Indications

- (Market Value of Equity Before Fundamental Adjustment / Market Value of Total Capital) (Line 5 / Line 3)

| | | | | | | 1 1100 to 1401 | moonic |
|----|--|-------------|---------------|----------------------|---------------|-----------------|---------------|
| | | _ | Market | Value of Total Capit | al to | (Market Value o | f Equity/NI) |
| | Derivation of Value | | Sales | EBITDA | EBIT | Ongoing/Tr 12 | Current FY |
| 1 | Appropriate Earnings or Performance Measure | | \$100,000,000 | \$15,000,000 | \$10,500,000 | \$6,500,000 | \$8,200,000 |
| 2 | x Guideline Company Capitalization Factor | | 1.25 | 8.10 | 11.15 | 16.00 | 13.50 |
| 3 | = Capitalized Value: Total Capital | | \$125,000,000 | \$121,500,000 | \$117,075,000 | \$104,000,000 | \$110,700,000 |
| 4 | - Interest Bearing Debt (Operational) | | (18,000,000) | (18,000,000) | (18,000,000) | | |
| 5 | = Capitalized Value: Total Common Equity | | \$107,000,000 | \$103,500,000 | \$99,075,000 | \$104,000,000 | \$110,700,000 |
| 6 | - Fundamental Adjustment | -35.0% | (37,450,000) | (36,225,000) | (34,676,250) | (36,400,000) | (38,745,000) |
| 7 | = Adjusted Guideline Company Capitalized Value | | \$69,550,000 | \$67,275,000 | \$64,398,750 | \$67,600,000 | \$71,955,000 |
| | | | | | | | |
| | INDICATED VALUES: | Rounded to: | | | | | |
| 8 | GUIDELINE COMPANY METHOD | \$10,000 | \$69,550,000 | \$67,280,000 | \$64,400,000 | \$67,600,000 | \$71,960,000 |
| | | | | | | | |
| 9 | Concluded Multiples Based on Derived Equity Value | | 0.876 | 5.685 | 7.848 | 10.400 | 8.776 |
| 10 | Effective Fundamental Adjustment to the Guideline Median | | -30.0% | -29.8% | -29.6% | -35.0% | -35.0% |
| 11 | Adjustment Factor (Equity to Total Capital) | | -14.4% | -14.8% | -15.4% | | |
| | | | | | | | |



Price to Net Income

| | Sample Company | | | | |
|---------------------------------------|---------------------|--------------|--|--|--|
| | Guideline Multiples | | | | |
| Guideline Companies | Revenues | EBITDA | | | |
| | 0.53 | 14.69 | | | |
| Multiples from Six Selected Guideline | 0.53 | 10.21 | | | |
| Companies Arranged in Descending | 0.52 | 9.67 | | | |
| Order for Ease of Visual Inspection | 0.34 | 7.72 | | | |
| | 0.26 | 7.44 | | | |
| | 0.13 | 5.40 | | | |
| Median Multiples Average Multiples | 0.43 0.39 | 8.69 9.19 | | | |

| 1. First Quartile Analysis | | | | | | |
|---|--------------|--------------|--|--|--|--|
| Calculate First Quartiles | 0.28 | 7.51 | | | | |
| Implied Adjustment from Overall Medians Implied Adjustment from Overall Averages | -35% -27% | -14% -18% | | | | |

| 2. Lower Half Average Analysis | | | | | | | |
|---|------|-------|--|--|--|--|--|
| | 0.53 | 14.69 | | | | | |
| Upper Half for Perspective | 0.53 | 10.21 | | | | | |
| | 0.52 | 9.67 | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | |
| Averages (for Top of Lower Half Range) | 0.39 | 9.19 | | | | | |
| | 0.34 | 7.72 | | | | | |
| Lower Half of Multiples (Including Average) | 0.26 | 7.44 | | | | | |
| | 0.13 | 5.40 | | | | | |
| Averages of Lower Half | 0.28 | 7.44 | | | | | |
| Implied Adjustment from Overall Medians | -35% | -14% | | | | | |
| Implied Adjustment from Overall Averages | -28% | -19% | | | | | |

Expected Cash Flows, Risk, and Growth



Fundamental Adjustments to Total Capital Multiples

$$FATC = FAE \times AF$$

$$AF = (MVE / MVTC)$$

$$V_{mm} = \begin{array}{c} CF_{mm} \\ \hline R_{mm} - G_{mm} \end{array} \qquad \begin{array}{c} \text{We look at public companies ...} \end{array}$$

$$V_{private} = \begin{array}{c} \frac{CF_{private, \, normalized}}{R_{private} - G_{private}} \end{array}$$
 ... to value private companies

Expected Cash Flows, Risk, and Growth



$$R_{private} \stackrel{\leq}{=} R_{mm}$$

- Often, private company is riskier than public guidelines
- Elements of Comparative Risk
 - Size (size premiums)
 - Company specific risk
 - Concentrations of many kinds
 - Key persons
 - Other



$$G_{\text{private}} \leq G_{\text{mm}}$$

- Often, the realistic expectations for growth of subject are less than expected growth rate imbedded in public company pricing
- Must be careful to compare expectations, which in public arena sometimes bear little resemblance to the recent past

Issue Five and a Half

Fundamental Adjustments in Relationship to Guideline Transactions and Guideline Public Company Groups

- Use of the fundamental adjustment can enhance credibility of guideline methods
- Consider that if the fundamental adjustment developed is too large (50%-60%-70%), the comparability of the selected guideline group is likely called into question
- Simply "picking a multiple" within a range of multiples or above or below the median of a group, without justification, lacks credibility
 - Consider modest adjustments within the range of appraiser judgment



The Biggest Issue

Understanding what drives valuation of an asset (always expected risk, expected cash flow, and the expected risk of achieving cash flows)

from the viewpoint of the relevant
(hypothetical or real) buyers and sellers in
the market(s) for the asset (i.e., relevant
market participants)

and in the context of the relevant standard of value

N: Wrap-up slide



The Five Really Big Issues

- 1. Discount Rates (Risk)
- 2. Control Premiums and Minority Interest Discounts (Cash Flow)
- 3. Adjustments to the Income Statement (Cash Flow)
- 4. Guideline Public Company Method and the Guideline Transactions Method (Cash Flow, Risk, Growth)
- 5. Fundamental Adjustments (Cash Flow, Risk, Growth)
- Marketability Discounts (Cash Flow, Risk, Growth)



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