A weekly update on issues important to the Investment Management industry
Normally, we would expect strong financial markets to validate most RIA models and at least hide the weaknesses of others. In this case, though, a rising tide isn’t lifting all the boats. Why? In this post, we pinpoint the reasons why and discuss a way forward.
One refrain we often hear from clients is how different they are from other investment management firms. We agree. Asset managers have a lot in common, but we see a huge variety of personalities, investment approaches, business plans, marketing activities, compensation models, etc. In short, every firm has a unique culture, just like families.
A question that we don’t hear enough RIAs asking themselves: what makes our best customer? The conventional wisdom we’ve gathered from talking with a wide variety of investment management firms over the years is that high net worth relationships make the best clients for RIAs. Relationships with individuals are supposed to be stickier than, say, institutional relationships where investment committees drop managers the moment their three-year performance lags the index. However, is it that simple?
After years of working with investment management firms of all shapes and sizes, it is our opinion that building the most value in an RIA comes down to the same thing: developing and capitalizing on some unfair advantage. That may sound unnecessarily mysterious or metaphorical, but it really boils down to examining the basic building blocks of firm architecture and finding out where your firm can excel like none other.
A persistent truth about investment management is that no analyst ever saw a piece of information he or she didn’t want. Professional investors are, by their very nature, research hounds – digging deep into a prospective investment’s operating model, financials, competitive landscape, management biographies, and whatever else might be relevant to try to evaluate the relative merit of buying into one idea instead of another. This same diligence doesn’t always extend to practice management, though, and we are not infrequently surprised at how little attention management teams at RIAs devote to studying their own companies.
Clients writing new buy-sell agreements or re-writing existing ones frequently ask us how often they should have their RIA valued. Like most things in life, it depends. We usually recommend having a firm valued annually, and most of our clients usually do just that. “Usually,” though, is subject to many specific considerations.
Hardly a week goes by that we don’t get asked what we think are optimal qualities of an RIA merger partner. Answering that always feels a little like giving dating advice: different partners suit different partners. No one disputes that the industry is ripe for consolidation, but there’s no easy way to “swipe-right” on a target company’s ADV, and it’s pretty unlikely that sec.gov is going to have its own version of Tinder anytime soon. Nevertheless, in honor of today’s holiday, here are a few thoughts on what to think about when considering a merger partner.
As difficult it is to imagine a valuable car such as the Ferrari 250GT SWB that we feature in this post being forgotten, what we see more commonly are forgotten buy-sell agreements, collecting dust in desk drawers. Unfortunately, these contracts often turn into liabilities, instead of assets, once they are exhumed, as the words on the page frequently commit the signatories to obligations long forgotten. So we encourage our clients to review their buy-sell agreements regularly, and have compiled some of our observations about how to do so in the whitepaper. We hope this will be helpful to you; call us if you have any questions.
By now you’ve probably read the SEC’s proposed rules on Adviser Business Continuity and Transition Plans. Most of the proposed rule simply codifies a reasonable standard for practice management at an RIA. Certain of the proposal’s requirements, such as IT management and being able to conduct business and communicate with staff and clients in the event of a natural disaster, are likely to be met with turn-key solutions from vendors. Of more interest is how the requirement for a “transition plan” in the event of the death or incapacitation of an advisory firm owner will be implemented.
In an industry characterized by constant pressure to adapt to market conditions and offer highly specialized client service, many financial advisors still spend a significant portion of their time acquiring new clients rather than collaborating with other professionals. According to Philip Palaveev in his recent book The Ensemble Practice, the majority of financial advisory practices still function as “solos,” or one individual against the entire market. This practice is inherently problematic in its lack of sustainability and the problems it poses for an owner who desires to leave a legacy post-retirement.
The closest we get to detective work at Mercer Capital is when we’re jointly retained to resolve a shareholder disagreement over a buy-out. Whether we’ve been court-appointed or mutually chosen by the parties to do the project, we’ve done enough of these over the years to learn that the process matters as much as the outcome. In this post, we discuss our process for handling such engagements.
Despite talented people, carefully developed business plans, and the best of intentions, not every partnership goes well, and some of those that don’t go well don’t end well either. When a partner leaves an investment management practice, the potential for a major dispute over the buy-out usually looms. Internally, at our firm, we sometimes refer to these situations as “business divorces”, even though the consequent acrimony often exceeds that of a marital dissolution. Here are a few mistakes we’ve seen others make, in the hopes that you read this and don’t do the same.
A recurring problem we see with buy-sell agreements are pricing mechanisms that are out of date. Keeping the language in your agreement up to date is important, but the most reliable way to avoid some unintended consequence of your buy-sell agreement is to have a pricing mechanism that specifies a regular valuation of your RIA’s stock. An annual valuation accomplishes a number of good things for an investment management firm, but the main one is managing expectations.
The subtitle of Chris Mercer’s original book on buy-sell agreements is “Ticking Time Bombs or Reasonable Resolutions?” Implicit in this title is that parties to buy-sell agreements too often discover the painful implications of the question never asked. I think about this every time we work on a dispute resolution project involving a buy-sell disagreement. In particular, I think about one of the first ones that I worked on, where maybe there was no disagreement, but should have been.
If an asset manager’s buy-sell agreement is going to specify reasonable expectations for the value of the firm, what are they? We think there are at least four elements that should be clearly stated in each buy-sell agreement to ward off costly ambiguity.
This post launches a series on buy-sell agreements, specifically as they pertain to RIAs. Buy-sell agreements are peculiar contracts between shareholders with a very specific purpose: to provide for the transition of ownership and liquidity in a business, usually in case of a specific event. Outside of a particular event, buy-sell agreements usually sit on a file server or in a desk drawer, and no one thinks about them, until a need arises to pull out the agreement – at which point no one can think about anything else.
Many times, conflicts with shareholders are unavoidable and are the natural bi-product of ownership transition and firm evolution. In these instances, a carefully crafted buy-sell agreement (“BSA”) can resolve these disputes in a fair and equitable manner (from a financial point of view) if the valuation process avoids common pitfalls. In this post, we discuss these pitfalls and how to keep your buy-sell agreement free of surprises.
As the Baby Boomer generation continues to age toward retirement, many “founder-centric” asset management firms face the prospect of internal succession. The recent book “Success and Succession,” by David W. Bianchi, Eric Hehman, Jay Hummel, and Tim Kochis, is written from the perspective of three individuals who have experienced successful ownership transitions. The book provides some interesting insights into the logistical, financial, and emotional process that internal succession entails through colorful accounts of past triumphs and train wrecks.
This post provides some brief thoughts about five topics, posed as questions, that can make or break the value of RIAs. These topics have longer term and more strategic implications than the day-to-day fluctuations in capital markets, and while equity research may be more fun, these are more reliably lucrative.
The shorthand method of valuation in many industries has long been some kind of “rule of thumb,” usually a multiple of some measure of gross scale or activity. In this post, we consider the pitfall of relying strictly on a rule of thumb.
In this week’s blog, we present a new whitepaper with some summary thoughts on the valuation of RIAs. Understanding the value of an asset management business requires some appreciation for what is simple and what is complex. On one level, a business with almost no balance sheet, a recurring revenue stream, and an expense base that mainly consists of personnel costs could not be more straightforward. At the same time, asset management firms exist in a narrow space between client allocations and the capital markets, and depend on revenue streams that rarely carry contractual obligations and valuable staff members who often are not subject to employment agreements. In essence, RIAs may be both highly profitable and prospectively ephemeral. Balancing the particular risks and opportunities of a given asset management firm is fundamental to developing a valuation.
