Transaction Advisory, Investment Management

September 7, 2021

Not Every RIA Buyer Is a Control Freak

Despite Conventional Wisdom, Some Investors Prefer Minority Positions

Ideally, our work with investment management firms at Mercer Capital distills both conventional valuation principles and real-world industry experience. These two influences typically align; valuation theory develops to represent the thinking of actual transacting parties, and – in turn – transaction behavior validates theory.

Sometimes, though, we witness rational actors engaging in transactions that challenge certain norms of professional thinking. At such times, we ask ourselves whether valuation theory, as we know it, is doctrine or dogma.

The pricing of minority transactions in the RIA space leaves some people scratching their head. Traditional valuation theory holds that investors pay less for minority interests than controlling interests. Reality suggests otherwise. Some established institutional buyers of minority interests in RIAs invest at similar, or even higher, multiples to what other consolidators will pay for controlling interests. Some institutional buyers even prefer taking minority stakes in investment management firms – not a circumstance we see much from the private equity community. Even insider transactions don’t always follow valuation maxims, as valuations for succession are colored by considerations far beyond the sterile realm of hypothetical buyers and sellers. It seems to some that the RIA community has turned valuation theory on its head, but the truth is more nuanced.

Valuation Vacuum Wonkery

Conventional wisdom holds that minority interests in closely held companies are worth less than their pro rata stake in the enterprise. A 15% interest in a business that would sell for $10 million is widely believed by valuation practitioners to be worth something less than the $1.5 million that its pro rata stake in the enterprise would otherwise command. The difference between value inherent in controlling interests and minority interests can be illustrated by way of a diagram known as a levels of value chart.

The value of an enterprise can be described as the present value of distributable cash flow – and this parameter is useful for thinking about the different perspectives of control and minority investors. A control level investor effectively has direct access to enterprise level cash flows, with unilateral influence over operations, the ability to buy, sell or merge the enterprise, pay distributions, and set compensation policy. Absent special considerations, a control investor can achieve the greatest benefit, and therefore pay (or expect to be paid) the highest price for an enterprise. Most reported transactions in the RIA channel are made on this basis, and M&A multiples reported publicly, or whispered privately, reflect change of control valuations.
Minority investors lack two important prerogatives of control: influence and liquidity.

Minority investors lack two important prerogatives of control: influence and liquidity. Discounts for lack of control – also known as minority interest discounts – reflect the inability of minority interest holders to direct the enterprise for their own benefit. The marketable, minority interest level of value is analogous to an interest in a publicly traded company, wherein investors can access the present value of distributable cash flow by way of an open market transaction but have no particular sway over a company’s strategy or operations.

Discounts for lack of marketability (a.k.a. marketability discounts) capture the lack of access to enterprise cash flows via distributions or a ready and organized market to sell the interest. The nonmarketable, minority interest level of value is what most valuation practitioners think of when they think of minority interests in closely held enterprises: a value which is materially distinct from a pro rata controlling interest.

Internal Transactions Challenge Valuation Theory

Real world economics of minority transactions in RIAs can look very different than our professional discipline would suggest, reflecting issues unique both to the industry and to the universe of typical investors in the industry.

Much of the reason that RIA transactions don’t always conform to traditional valuation pedagogy is the nature of the investment management model itself. The theory behind the levels of value is intended to represent the perspective of hypothetical disinterested investors. In a world of financial buyers who can choose freely between alternative instruments, this idea holds.

But most RIA investors are insiders, practitioners who work at the investment management firms. The lines between returns to labor and returns to capital are often blurred (although we strongly advise structuring your model otherwise). Insiders have different motivations to show loyalty to their employer, and in turn firms often bestow ownership on staff on favorable terms because of the labor-intensive, relationship-based nature of investment management.

Insider ownership is often managed by buy-sell agreements, which at the same time restrict owners from certain actions but also provide them with access to liquidity (under specified circumstances) and a claim on returns. Buy-sell agreements often establish particular parameters for valuation as a way to side-step valuation theory to benefit the ownership and the business model of the particular RIA. Valuation theory operates in a ceteris paribus (all else equal) universe, whereas buy-sell agreements do not operate in this vacuum.

Valuation theory operates in an all else equal universe, whereas buy-sell agreements do not.

Finally, the issue of discounts for lack of marketability – that minority investors suffer from lack of ready access to enterprise level cash flows – is a byproduct of focus on old economy, heavy industry businesses structured as C-corporations in which dividend policy can be parsimonious. Most RIAs are structured as tax pass-through enterprises (LLCs or S-corporations) and don’t rely on heavy amounts of capital reinvestment. High payout ratios (often nearing 100%) mean minority investors do, in fact, typically enjoy regular returns from enterprise cash flows. Consequently, discounts for lack of marketability are usually smaller for investment management firms than for minority investments in many other industries.

Institutional Investors Make Minority Investments With Majority Conditions

One would expect institutional investors, as financially driven actors who are free to invest across a broad spectrum of opportunities, to behave in a manner more consistent with the hypothetical investors described by valuation theory. The institutional community has, however, developed practices to protect itself from many of the vagaries of minority investing. Achieving rights and returns similar to control investors has led to transaction pricing on par with control transactions, a phenomenon which isn’t inconsistent with conventional wisdom.

Institutional investors in the RIA space have corrected for many of the disadvantages associated with being a minority investor by way of contractual minority interest protections.

Institutional investors in the RIA space have corrected for many of the disadvantages associated with being a minority investor by way of contractual minority interest protections. No two firms handle this the same way, but board representation, performance reporting, rights to change senior management, compensation agreements, bonus plans, restrictions on non-cash benefits, assurance of timing and performance for distributions, and even revenue sharing arrangements can go a long way to putting a minority investor on terms comparable to a majority owner. Without the risks that accompany lack of control and lack of marketability, minority participants can focus on the value of the enterprise.

As an added benefit, if management still holds most of a firm’s equity, then outside investors have more assurance that insiders will pay attention to their jobs. This avoids the issue of RIA leadership “calling in rich” following a lucrative recapitalization and mitigates the monitoring costs that accompany most private equity investing. Sitting alongside management on an economic basis, but knowing management is sufficiently motivated, many institutional investors have effectively created the best of both worlds in minority investing: comparable returns without comparable responsibility.

Valuation Theory Is the Real World

Ultimately, valuation models are descriptive, not prescriptive. The economic principles underlying valuation models are the real secret sauce.

The behavior of insiders and professional investors is often seen in conflict with the notion that minority interests carry a lower value than pro rata control. In fact, these minority investors are not typical, coupling their money with conditions of ownership that mitigate or eliminate the distinctions between value on an enterprise basis and value on a fractional basis. In our view, the behavior of professional minority investors substantiates the presence of valuation discounts for investors who lack similar protections and privileges.

About the car: In the late 1950s, while Detroit focused on building huge, heavy, powerful, front engine sedans and wagons, Italian automaker Fiat designed a petite coupe with a canvas roof and a two-cylinder rear-mounted engine. The Fiat 500 was as contradictory to conventional wisdom at the time as it was easy to park and cheap to own. Detroit boomed, but the Cinquecento sold almost four million units over 18 years. Different markets have different needs.

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Eagle Ford – 2017/2018 Acquisition & Divestiture Commentary (1)
Eagle Ford – 2017/2018 Acquisition & Divestiture Commentary
Transaction activity in the Eagle Ford Shale has been fairly steady over the past 12 months, with the majority of transactions in the $100-300 million range.  The seller’s rationale has most often been about balance sheet management and re-allocation to other plays, usually the Permian Basin.  However, the Eagle Ford area has some quality economics of its own, which has been attractive to buyers.  Many argue it has the best shale production economics in the U.S. next to the Permian Basin.  These differing strategy based swaps have been at the heart of transaction flow.  This has also led to consideration that Devon may sell its Eagle Ford division in search of returns elsewhere.  The chart below, drawn from Mercer Capital’s newsletter, shows some details in regards to the transactions including some comparative valuation metrics.Magnolia – Blank Check Company forms a New South Texas ProducerThe largest transaction in the past year was the recent announcement of a special purpose acquisition entity (“SPAC”) coming to an agreement with certain Enervest controlled funds.  The result of the merger is the creation of a pure play Eagle Ford and Austin Chalk company with 360,000 net acres in South Texas.   The majority of that acreage is in what is known as the Giddings field which is an oil play in the Austin Chalk (mostly held by production).Break-evens are claimed to be in the low $30’s per barrel with one year (or less) paybacks in Karnes and Giddings field.  Magnolia1 is led by a former Occidental Petroleum executive, Steve Chazen, who has both short and long-term optimism for the opportunity.  Estimated EBITDA for 2018 is projected at $513 million including approximately $240 million of cash flow after capital expenditures.Highest and Best EconomicsDenver-based Sundance Energy Australia Ltd. struck a deal with Pioneer Natural Resource Co. to buy almost 22,000 acres and 1,800 boe/d of production in the Eagle Ford Shale, bolting on to an existing leasehold in South Texas.The pure-play Eagle Ford player agreed to pay $221.5 million for the leasehold, which runs through McMullen, Atascosa, LaSalle and Live Oak counties. The transaction would give Sundance 56,600 total acres in the play, with an inventory of 716 gross undrilled locations.Meanwhile, Pioneer was exiting to focus on the Permian Basin.  Pioneer announced in February it would put most of its resources going forward into the Permian and planned to sell nearly all “non-Permian” projects, including in the Eagle Ford, Raton Basin, and West Texas Panhandle.  The table below demonstrates why its desire to focus on the Permian was warranted.  However, one thing to note is that purchasing acreage in the Permian is much more expensive than the Eagle Ford, so drilling most likely needs to be based on existing acreage positions. Overall, the Eagle Ford’s economics are improving (Venado – a KKR backed Austin firm, made a $765 million purchase from Cabot that was based on this optimism). About 61,500 net acres of the Venado position, which is located primarily in Frio and Atascosa counties in South Texas, is operated and about 9,400 net acres are non-operated. Production from the properties during third-quarter 2017 was 15,656 barrels of oil equivalent per day. An interesting discussion on this acquisition can be found in this video: ?? Have a great week! Endnote1 In case one was wondering - Chip and Joanna Gaines are not involved.
Bankruptcy: An Overview Part 3 (1)
Bankruptcy: An Overview Part 3
From January through May of this year, 39 E&P companies and 31 oilfield services companies had to file for bankruptcy. This post is the last in a series of three aimed at helping those companies, and any others who may face bankruptcy in the future, to understand the valuation-related aspects of Chapter 11 restructuring. In the first post we highlighted two reorganization requirements tied to valuation. First, the plan should demonstrate that the economic outcomes for the consenting stakeholders are superior under the Chapter 11 proceeding compared to a Chapter 7 proceeding. Second, upon confirmation by the bankruptcy court, the plan must not be likely to result in liquidation or further reorganization. In the second post we explored in depth the consequences of the first requirement. Here we examine the importance of the second requirement.Cash-Flow TestFor a company that has followed the steps explained in the previous post, this second requirement represents the last valuation hurdle to successfully emerging from Chapter 11 restructuring. Even if a company shows that the restructuring plan will benefit stakeholders more than liquidation will, the court will still reject the plan if it is likely to lead to liquidation or further restructuring in the foreseeable future. To satisfy the court, a cash-flow test is used to analyze whether the restructured company would generate enough cash to consistently pay its debts. This cash-flow test can be broken into three parts.The first step in conducting the cash-flow test is to identify the cash-flows that the restructured company will generate. These cash-flows are available to service all the obligations of the emerging entity. Remember the discussion in the second post—a stream of cash-flows is developed using the DCF method in order to determine the reorganization value. Thus, in practice, establishing the appropriate stream of cash-flows for the cash-flow test is often a straightforward matter of using these projected cash-flows in the new model.Once the fundamental cash-flow projections are incorporated, analysts then model the negotiated or litigated terms attributable to the creditors of the emerging entity. This involves projecting interest and principal payments to the creditors, including any amounts due to providers of short term, working capital facilities. These are the payments for each period that the cash-flow generated up to that point must be able to cover in order for the company to avoid another bankruptcy.The cash-flows of the company will not be used only to pay debts, and so the third and final step in the cash-flow test is documenting the impact of the net cash-flows on the entire balance sheet of the emerging entity. This entails modeling changes in the company’s asset base as portions of the expected cash-flows are invested in working capital and capital equipment; and modeling changes in the debt obligations of and equity interests in the company as the remaining cash-flows are disbursed to the capital providers. A reorganization plan is generally considered viable if such a detailed cash-flow model indicates solvent operations for the foreseeable future.ConclusionAlthough the Chapter 11 process can seem like no more than a burden, a rigorous assessment of cash-flows and a company’s capital structure can help the company as it tries to develop a plan for years of future success. We hope that these past three posts explaining the key valuation-related steps of a Chapter 11 restructuring help managers realize this potential.However, we also understand that executives of oil and gas companies going through a Chapter 11 restructuring process need to juggle an extraordinary set of additional responsibilities—evaluating alternate strategies, implementing new and difficult business plans, and negotiating with various stakeholders. Given executives’ multitude of other responsibilities, they often decide that it is best to seek help from outside, third party specialists. Valuation specialists can relieve some of the burden from executives by developing the valuation and financial analysis necessary to satisfy the requirements for a reorganization plan to be confirmed by a bankruptcy court. Specialists can also provide useful advice and perspective during the negotiation of the reorganization plan to help the company emerge with the best chance of success. With years of experience in both oil and gas, and in bankruptcy, at Mercer Capital, we are well positioned to help in both of these roles. For a confidential conversation about bankruptcy proceedings and how we can help, please contact a Mercer Capital professional.
Does AI Spending Increase an RIA’s Value-or Just Reduce Its EBITDA?
Does AI Spending Increase an RIA’s Value - or Just Reduce Its EBITDA?
AI investment can create value for RIAs by improving capacity, growth, efficiency, and risk management, but the benefits must ultimately translate into stronger cash flow or reduced risk. Recurring AI costs generally remain operating expenses, making measurable adoption and returns critical to valuation.

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