Transaction Advisory, Financial Services

July 25, 2018

M&A Update: Good Gets Better

After a slow start, M&A activity among U.S. commercial banks and thrifts picked up to the point where 2018 should look like recent years. Historically, approximately 2% to 4% of the industry is absorbed each year via M&A. Since 2014, the pace has been at or slightly above 4% as a well performing economy, readily available financing, rising stock prices for bank acquirers, and strong asset quality and earnings of would be sellers have supported activity.

There were 140 announced transactions according to S&P Global Market Intelligence through early July, which equates to 2.4% of 5,913 FDIC-insured institutions that existed as of year-end 2017. The average assets per transaction based upon YTD activity was $656 million, which is below the 28 year average of $1.1 billion.

Pricing has trended higher as measured by the average price/tangible book value (P/TBV) multiple, which increased to 172% in 2018 from 164% in 2017 and about 140% in 2014-2016 before the sector was revalued after the national election on November 8, 2016. The median P/E based upon trailing 12 month earnings increased to 26x in 2018 from 23x in 2017 and 21x in 2016; however, the 2018 P/E based upon trailing 12 month earnings does not reflect a full year impact of the reduction in the top marginal federal tax rate to 21% from 35% that occurred on January 1. The adjusted P/E assuming the lower tax rate was in effect for 2017, too, is around 20-22x. Lower tax rates notwithstanding, it appears that buyers are still paying roughly 9-13x pro forma earnings assuming all expense savings are fully realized, a level of pricing that we believe has existed for many years excluding periods when industry fundamentals are stressed. For example, Fifth Third Bancorp (FITB) estimates the $4.6 billion consideration to be paid to MB Financial (MBFI) shareholders equates to 16.4x consensus 2019 earnings and 9.6x assuming all expense savings realized in 2019 (which will not be the case due to the phase-in lag).

Cash Deals vs. Mix/Stock Deals

Dig deeper and, of course, there is more to the pricing story. The reduction in tax rates has had a material impact on profitability. Depending upon the index bank stocks rose 25-30% in the three months after the national election on November 8, 2016, on the expectation of what has mostly played out: a reduction in corporate tax rates, less regulation, higher short rates and faster economic growth.

The improvement in public market multiples has supported expansion of M&A multiples when the majority of the consideration consists of the buyer’s common shares. As shown in Table 1, the median P/TBV and P/E ratios for transactions announced in the 20 months since the election were 173% and 23.0x compared to 147% and 20.3x for the 20 months ended November 8, 2016. Multiple expansion is even more pronounced when only 2018 deals are considered because the YTD median P/TBV and P/E multiples are 193% and 25.4x. Not surprisingly (to us), the median multiples for cash deals did not rise as much, increasing to 141% after the election compared to the 20 month pre-election median of 123%. Cash did not inflate in value over this period like public market bank stock valuations; hence, the only meaningful factor that drove the limited improvement in cash acquisition multiples was the increase in ROE. In addition, cash activity slowed post-election because buyers and sellers waited to see if would be sellers’ earning power would increase from a reduction in corporate tax rates, which was not confirmed until late 2017. Transactions in which the primary form of consideration consisted of the buyer’s common shares did not have to wait for the tax issue to be resolved because buyer and seller both faced the issue.

Small Deals, Larger Deals, and Perhaps Big Deals

M&A is largely a story of the consolidation of the small banks by large community and small regional banks. Two decades ago the theme was the same, but overlaid was the formation of the nationwide and multi-region franchises through mega-mergers such as NCNB/Bank of America and Wells Fargo/Norwest.

Since the financial crisis, activity has mostly been confined to small deals with deal values a fraction of the pre-crisis and especially pre-2000 amounts. Annualized year-to-date deal value is $33 billion, which compares to approximately $26 billion annually during 2015-2017. By comparison, the value of announced transactions in 1997 and 1998 were many multiples greater at $97 billion and $289 billion, respectively.

During the past five years, there only have been 10 deals that exceeded $2 billion of consideration and 22 deals in which the consideration exceeded $1 billion. As shown in Table 2, the two largest transactions involved Canadian banks, while three involved the large Ohio-based banks.

Change may be afoot, however. Fifth Third’s $4.6 billion pending acquisition of MB Financial is its first bank acquisition since 2008, and it was announced a couple of days before President Trump signed into law the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act. Among other things, the financial deregulation law moved the SIFI asset threshold from $50 billion to $100 billion and provided significant relief for institutions such as Fifth Third that fall within the $100 billion to $250 billion asset bucket. Notably, during the past five years only CIT Group crossed the prior $50 billion SIFI threshold via acquisition, and apparently did so at the urging of regulators who wanted CIT to shore up its deposit funding. We look for more activity among mid-sized regional banks that are near or over $50 billion of assets; however, deal activity among the very largest banks is off the table given the $250 billion asset threshold for the global SIFI designation and the 10% nationwide deposit market share cap if pierced via acquisition. The potential fly in the ointment to the robust bank M&A environment is the flattening yield curve and the attendant underperformance of bank stocks this year. If bank stocks lag and valuations compress further, then it may be difficult for buyers to meet inflated seller expectations that rarely take into account downward moves in buyers’ share prices.

How We Can Help

The adage banks are sold rather than bought is largely true, meaning most banks transact when the sellers are ready to do so. Sometimes that occurs after years of planning; sometimes it occurs unexpectedly when another institution makes a casual inquiry.

Mercer Capital has over three decades of experience as a financial advisor helping institutions navigate the process as buyer and seller. Even if your board has no interest in selling (or buying) we would be happy to present an overview to your board about the lay of the land as it relates to the public market, M&A market and what actions your board might consider to enhance value. Please call if we can be of assistance.

Originally published in Bank Watch, July 2018.

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Eagle Ford – 2017/2018 Acquisition & Divestiture Commentary (1)
Eagle Ford – 2017/2018 Acquisition & Divestiture Commentary
Transaction activity in the Eagle Ford Shale has been fairly steady over the past 12 months, with the majority of transactions in the $100-300 million range.  The seller’s rationale has most often been about balance sheet management and re-allocation to other plays, usually the Permian Basin.  However, the Eagle Ford area has some quality economics of its own, which has been attractive to buyers.  Many argue it has the best shale production economics in the U.S. next to the Permian Basin.  These differing strategy based swaps have been at the heart of transaction flow.  This has also led to consideration that Devon may sell its Eagle Ford division in search of returns elsewhere.  The chart below, drawn from Mercer Capital’s newsletter, shows some details in regards to the transactions including some comparative valuation metrics.Magnolia – Blank Check Company forms a New South Texas ProducerThe largest transaction in the past year was the recent announcement of a special purpose acquisition entity (“SPAC”) coming to an agreement with certain Enervest controlled funds.  The result of the merger is the creation of a pure play Eagle Ford and Austin Chalk company with 360,000 net acres in South Texas.   The majority of that acreage is in what is known as the Giddings field which is an oil play in the Austin Chalk (mostly held by production).Break-evens are claimed to be in the low $30’s per barrel with one year (or less) paybacks in Karnes and Giddings field.  Magnolia1 is led by a former Occidental Petroleum executive, Steve Chazen, who has both short and long-term optimism for the opportunity.  Estimated EBITDA for 2018 is projected at $513 million including approximately $240 million of cash flow after capital expenditures.Highest and Best EconomicsDenver-based Sundance Energy Australia Ltd. struck a deal with Pioneer Natural Resource Co. to buy almost 22,000 acres and 1,800 boe/d of production in the Eagle Ford Shale, bolting on to an existing leasehold in South Texas.The pure-play Eagle Ford player agreed to pay $221.5 million for the leasehold, which runs through McMullen, Atascosa, LaSalle and Live Oak counties. The transaction would give Sundance 56,600 total acres in the play, with an inventory of 716 gross undrilled locations.Meanwhile, Pioneer was exiting to focus on the Permian Basin.  Pioneer announced in February it would put most of its resources going forward into the Permian and planned to sell nearly all “non-Permian” projects, including in the Eagle Ford, Raton Basin, and West Texas Panhandle.  The table below demonstrates why its desire to focus on the Permian was warranted.  However, one thing to note is that purchasing acreage in the Permian is much more expensive than the Eagle Ford, so drilling most likely needs to be based on existing acreage positions. Overall, the Eagle Ford’s economics are improving (Venado – a KKR backed Austin firm, made a $765 million purchase from Cabot that was based on this optimism). About 61,500 net acres of the Venado position, which is located primarily in Frio and Atascosa counties in South Texas, is operated and about 9,400 net acres are non-operated. Production from the properties during third-quarter 2017 was 15,656 barrels of oil equivalent per day. An interesting discussion on this acquisition can be found in this video: ?? Have a great week! Endnote1 In case one was wondering - Chip and Joanna Gaines are not involved.
Bankruptcy: An Overview Part 3 (1)
Bankruptcy: An Overview Part 3
From January through May of this year, 39 E&P companies and 31 oilfield services companies had to file for bankruptcy. This post is the last in a series of three aimed at helping those companies, and any others who may face bankruptcy in the future, to understand the valuation-related aspects of Chapter 11 restructuring. In the first post we highlighted two reorganization requirements tied to valuation. First, the plan should demonstrate that the economic outcomes for the consenting stakeholders are superior under the Chapter 11 proceeding compared to a Chapter 7 proceeding. Second, upon confirmation by the bankruptcy court, the plan must not be likely to result in liquidation or further reorganization. In the second post we explored in depth the consequences of the first requirement. Here we examine the importance of the second requirement.Cash-Flow TestFor a company that has followed the steps explained in the previous post, this second requirement represents the last valuation hurdle to successfully emerging from Chapter 11 restructuring. Even if a company shows that the restructuring plan will benefit stakeholders more than liquidation will, the court will still reject the plan if it is likely to lead to liquidation or further restructuring in the foreseeable future. To satisfy the court, a cash-flow test is used to analyze whether the restructured company would generate enough cash to consistently pay its debts. This cash-flow test can be broken into three parts.The first step in conducting the cash-flow test is to identify the cash-flows that the restructured company will generate. These cash-flows are available to service all the obligations of the emerging entity. Remember the discussion in the second post—a stream of cash-flows is developed using the DCF method in order to determine the reorganization value. Thus, in practice, establishing the appropriate stream of cash-flows for the cash-flow test is often a straightforward matter of using these projected cash-flows in the new model.Once the fundamental cash-flow projections are incorporated, analysts then model the negotiated or litigated terms attributable to the creditors of the emerging entity. This involves projecting interest and principal payments to the creditors, including any amounts due to providers of short term, working capital facilities. These are the payments for each period that the cash-flow generated up to that point must be able to cover in order for the company to avoid another bankruptcy.The cash-flows of the company will not be used only to pay debts, and so the third and final step in the cash-flow test is documenting the impact of the net cash-flows on the entire balance sheet of the emerging entity. This entails modeling changes in the company’s asset base as portions of the expected cash-flows are invested in working capital and capital equipment; and modeling changes in the debt obligations of and equity interests in the company as the remaining cash-flows are disbursed to the capital providers. A reorganization plan is generally considered viable if such a detailed cash-flow model indicates solvent operations for the foreseeable future.ConclusionAlthough the Chapter 11 process can seem like no more than a burden, a rigorous assessment of cash-flows and a company’s capital structure can help the company as it tries to develop a plan for years of future success. We hope that these past three posts explaining the key valuation-related steps of a Chapter 11 restructuring help managers realize this potential.However, we also understand that executives of oil and gas companies going through a Chapter 11 restructuring process need to juggle an extraordinary set of additional responsibilities—evaluating alternate strategies, implementing new and difficult business plans, and negotiating with various stakeholders. Given executives’ multitude of other responsibilities, they often decide that it is best to seek help from outside, third party specialists. Valuation specialists can relieve some of the burden from executives by developing the valuation and financial analysis necessary to satisfy the requirements for a reorganization plan to be confirmed by a bankruptcy court. Specialists can also provide useful advice and perspective during the negotiation of the reorganization plan to help the company emerge with the best chance of success. With years of experience in both oil and gas, and in bankruptcy, at Mercer Capital, we are well positioned to help in both of these roles. For a confidential conversation about bankruptcy proceedings and how we can help, please contact a Mercer Capital professional.
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During the second quarter of 2026, deal volume and average pricing in middle market M&A was relatively stable compared to prior quarters’ activity.
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