Heath A. Hamby

CFA

Vice President

Heath Hamby is a vice president with Mercer Capital. Heath has valuation experience in engagements related to corporate planning and reorganizations, financial reporting, fairness opinions, litigation support, employee stock ownership plans, and estate and gift tax planning and compliance matters.

As a member of Mercer Capital’s Financial Institutions Group, he prepares valuation analyses related to transactions, fairness opinions, equity compensation arrangements, shareholder agreements, and other circumstances.

Professional Memberships

  • The CFA Institute

Professional Designations

  • Chartered Financial Analyst (The CFA Institute)

Education

  • University of Tennessee, Knoxville, Tennessee (B.S., Finance, 2016)

Authored Content

March 2026 | Capital Allocation: The Strategic Decision in a Slower Growth Environment
Bank Watch: March 2026

Capital Allocation: The Strategic Decision in a Slower Growth Environment

Following several years of balance sheet volatility and margin pressure, the operating environment for banks improved in 2025 as most posted higher earnings on expanded net interest margins. The outlook for 2026, at least prior to the outbreak of the U.S./Israel-Iran war, reflects(ed) a relatively stable operating environment.Stability, however, introduces a different challenge. Loan growth has moderated across much of the industry, and the benefit from asset repricing has largely been realized. In this environment, earnings growth is less dependent on external tailwinds and more dependent on internal discipline. As a result, capital allocation has moved to the center of strategic decision-making.The Expanding Capital Allocation ToolkitCapital allocation discussions are often framed around dividends and, to a lesser extent, share repurchases. In practice, the range of capital deployment decisions is broader and more interconnected. Banks today are balancing:Organic balance sheet growthTechnology and infrastructure investmentDividendsShare repurchasesM&ABalance sheet repositioningRetained capital for flexibilityEach alternative carries different implications for risk, return, and long-term franchise value.Organic growth often is the preferred use for internally generated capital when the risk-adjusted returns exceed the cost of equity. However, competitive loan pricing and a tough environment to grow low cost deposits have narrowed spreads, reducing the margin for error. Similarly, technology investments may improve efficiency over time but require upfront capital with uncertain timing of returns.Returns, Valuation, and Market DisciplinePublic market valuations provide a useful lens for evaluating capital allocation decisions. As shown in Figure 1(on the next page), banks that generate higher returns on tangible common equity (ROTCE) tend to command higher price-to-tangible book value multiples. This can also be expressed algebraically, at least on paper, whereby P/E x ROTCE = P/TBV, while P/Es reflect investor assessments about growth and risk.This relationship reflects a straightforward principle: capital should be deployed where it earns returns in excess of the cost of equity. When internal opportunities meet that threshold, reinvestment should be appropriate. When returns are below the threshold, returning capital to shareholders through special dividends or repurchases may create greater per-share value.Share repurchases, in particular, can be an effective tool when executed below intrinsic value and when capital levels remain sufficient to support strategic flexibility. However, repurchases that do not improve per-share metrics or are offset by dilution from other sources may have limited impact.Figure 1: Publicly Traded Banks with Assets $1 to $5 BillionBalance Sheet Repositioning as Capital AllocationIn some cases, capital allocation decisions are embedded within the balance sheet itself. One example is securities portfolio repositioning.Many banks continue to hold securities originated during the low-rate environment of 2020 and 2021. While unrealized losses associated with these portfolios have moderated, the yield on these assets often remains well below current market rates.Repositioning the portfolio, by realizing losses and reinvesting at higher yields, represents a tradeoff between near-term capital impact and longer-term earnings improvement. In effect, this decision can be evaluated similarly to other capital deployment alternatives, with management weighing the upfront reduction in Tier 1 Capital against the expected lift to net interest income and returns over time.As with M&A, the concept of an “earnback period” can be applied. Institutions that approach repositioning with a clear understanding of the payback dynamics are better positioned to evaluate whether the strategy enhances long-term shareholder value. We offer the caveat that institutions who evaluate restructuring transactions should compare the expected return from realizing losses (i.e., reducing regulatory capital) with instead holding the securities and repurchasing shares. If the bank’s shares are sufficiently cheap, then it could make sense to continue to hold the underwater bonds until the shares rise sufficiently.M&A and Capital FlexibilityM&A remains a viable capital deployment option, particularly for institutions seeking scale or improved operating efficiency. However, transaction activity continues to be constrained by pricing discipline, tangible book value dilution, and investor expectations around earnback periods.Public market valuations ultimately serve as a governor on deal pricing, reinforcing the importance of aligning capital deployment decisions with shareholder return expectations.Conclusion: Discipline Drives OutcomesIn a slower growth environment, capital allocation is not a secondary consideration; it is a core driver of performance. While banks cannot control market multiples, they can control how capital is deployed across competing opportunities.Institutions that consistently allocate capital with a clear focus on risk-adjusted returns, strategic alignment, and per-share value creation are more likely to generate sustainable growth in earnings and tangible book value. In the current environment, disciplined execution may prove more valuable than more aggressive but less certain alternatives.
October 2025 | The New Frontier of Consumer Credit: Banks vs. Fintechs
Bank Watch: October 2025

Evaluating the Buyer’s Shares and The New Frontier of Consumer Credit: Banks vs. Fintechs 

Bank M&A activity has surged in 2025, with roughly 175 transactions expected by year-end. For selling shareholders, deal consideration often includes the buyer’s stock—raising important questions about the investment merits of those shares. Understanding liquidity, profitability, valuation, and capital management is critical, yet often overlooked. Mercer Capital outlines key factors boards should consider when evaluating a buyer’s shares and highlights why “value” deserves as much attention as “price.”
April 2025 | Mortgage Banking’s Next Chapter
Bank Watch: April 2025

Mortgage Banking’s Next Chapter: Is a Recovery Taking Root?

After years of booming mortgage profits driven by ultra-low rates, the industry has faced a prolonged slump amid stubbornly high mortgage rates and weakened housing demand. Despite rate cuts by the Fed, affordability remains strained, and mortgage volumes lag forecasts. However, transaction volume is expected to pick up despite high rates while home prices remain flattish, which should serve to boost mortgage originations. Major moves by Rocket Companies, including acquisitions of Redfin and Mr. Cooper, hint that the worst may be over and a recovery in mortgage banking could be taking shape.
Fed Rate Cut(s) – Now What?
Fed Rate Cut(s) – Now What?
Rate cycles are predictable in one sense: a period of falling rates tends to follow a period of rising rates. The opposite is true, too.
Specialty Finance M&A
Specialty Finance M&A
Acquiring a specialty finance company comes with a unique set of hurdles, different than acquiring a bank.
Bank Impairment Testing
Bank Impairment Testing
Bank stocks have underperformed in the broad market since the beginning of the year and many currently trade below book value, which begs the question, is goodwill impaired?
Statutory Fair Value vs Fair Market Value (and Fair Value): Not So Subtle Differences
Statutory Fair Value vs Fair Market Value (and Fair Value): Not So Subtle Differences
Over the past year we have seen an uptick in transactions (and contemplated transactions) in which boards seek to reduce the number of shareholders via reverse stock splits and cash out mergers. The central question for a board aside from fairness and process is: what price?
April 2022
Bank Watch: April 2022
In this issue: Statutory Fair Value vs Fair Market Value (and Fair Value): Not So Subtle Differences
Mortgage Banking Lagniappe
Mortgage Banking Lagniappe
2020 was a tough year for most of us. Schools and churches closed, sports were cancelled, and many lost their jobs. There were a select few, however, that thrived during 2020. Jeff Bezos and Elon Musk saw a meteoric rise in their personal net worth over the past 12 months. Mortgage bankers are another group showered with unexpected riches last year (and apparently this year).As shown in Figure 1, long-term U.S. Treasury and mortgage rates have been in a long-term secular decline for about four decades. Last year, long-term rates fell to all-time lows because of the COVID induced recession after having declined modestly in 2019 following too much Fed tightening in 2018. The surprise was not an uptick in refinancing activity, but that it was accompanied by a strong purchase market too. Housing was and still is hot; maybe too hot. Overlaid on the record volume (the Mortgage Bankers of America estimates $3.6 trillion of mortgages were originated in 2020 compared to $2.3 trillion in 2019 and $1.7 trillion in 2017 and 2018) was historically high gain on sale (“GOS”) margins. The industry was capacity constrained after cutting staff in 2018 when rates were then rising. Private equity and other owners of mortgage companies set their eyes on the public markets after many companies attempted to sell in 2018 with mixed success at best. During the second half of 2020, Rocket Mortgage ($RKT) and Guild Mortgage ($GHLD) made an initial public offering and began trading while seven other nonbank mortgage companies have either filed for an IPO or announced plans to do so. Also, United Wholesale Mortgage ($UWMC) went public by merging with a SPAC. The inability of several (or more) mortgage companies to undergo an IPO at a price that was acceptable to the sellers has an important message. The industry was accorded a low valuation by Wall Street on presumably peak earnings even though many mortgage companies will produce an ROE that easily exceeds 30%. The assumption is that earnings will decline because rates will rise and/or more capacity will reduce GOS margins. While it is likely 2020 will represent a cyclical peak, no one knows how steep (or gentle) the descent will be and how deep the trough will be. Mortgage companies may produce 20% or better ROEs for several years. One may question the multiple to place on 2020 earnings, but book value could double in three or four years if conditions remain reasonably favorable. Community and regional banks with mortgage operations have benefitted from the mortgage boom, too. Although various bank indices were negative for the year, it could have been much worse given investor fears surrounding credit losses and permanent impairment to net interest margins given the collapse in rates. In a sense, outsized mortgage banking revenues funded reserve builds for many banks and masked revenue weakness attributable to falling NIMs. The average NIM for banks in the U.S. with assets between $300 million and $1 billion as of September 30, 2020 is shown in Figure 2. The NIM fell 45bps from 3Q19 to 3Q20 due to multiple moving pieces but primarily reflected an increase in liquid assets because deposits flooded into the banking system and because the reduction in the yield on loans and securities was greater than the reduction in the cost of funds. Unless the Fed is able (and willing) to raise short-term policy rates in the next year or two, we suspect loan yields will grind lower as lenders compete heavily for assets with a coupon (i.e., loans) because liquidity yields nothing and bonds yield very little. Deposit costs will not offset because rates are or soon will be near a floor. Fee income and expense management are more critical than ever for banks to maintain acceptable profitability. When analyzing the same group of banks (assets $300M - $1B), banks with higher GOS revenues as a percentage of total revenue tended to be more profitable. As shown in Figure 3, median profitability was ~15% greater in the trailing twelve months for banks more engaged in mortgage activity than those that were not. Selling long-term fixed-rate mortgages for most banks is a given because the duration of the asset is too long, especially when rates are low. The decision is more nuanced for 15-year mortgages with an average life of perhaps 6-7 years. With loan demand weak and banks extremely liquid, most banks will retain all ARM production and perhaps some 15-year paper as an alternative to investing in MBS because yields on originated paper are much better. As for 30-year mortgages, net production profits for 3Q20 increased above 200bps according to the MBA for the first time since the MBA began tracking the data in 2008. Originating and selling long-term fixed rate mortgages has been exceptionally profitable in 2020. Mortgage banking in the form of originations is a highly cyclical business (vs servicing); however, it is a counter-cyclical business that tends to do well when the economy is struggling and therefore core bank profitability is under pressure. We have long been observers of the mortgage banking conundrum of “what is the earnings multiple?” It is a tougher question for an independent mortgage company compared to a bank where the earnings are part of a larger organization. Even when outsized mortgage banking earnings may weigh on a bank’s overall P/E, mortgage earnings can be highly accretive to capital. In the February issue of Bank Watch, we will explore how to value a mortgage company either as a stand-alone or as a subsidiary or part of a bank to understand in more detail the true valuation impacts of mortgage revenue. Originally appeared in Mercer Capital’s Bank Watch, January 2021.
Mortgage Banking Lagniappe (Part II)
Mortgage Banking Lagniappe (Part II)
The January Bank Watch provided an overview of the mortgage industry and its importance in boosting bank earnings in the current low-rate environment. As we discussed, mortgage volume is inversely correlated to interest rates and more volatile than net interest income. In this article, we discuss key considerations in valuing a mortgage company/subsidiary, including how the public markets price them.Valuation ApproachesSimilar to typical bank valuations, there are three approaches to consider when determining the value of a mortgage company/subsidiary: the asset approach, the market approach, and the income approach. However, since the composition of both the balance sheet and income statement differ from banks, several nuances arise.Asset ApproachAsset based valuation methods include those methods that write up (or down) or otherwise adjust the various tangible and/or intangible assets of an enterprise. For a mortgage company, these assets may include mortgage servicing rights (“MSR”). The fair value of the MSR book is the net present value of servicing revenue minus related expenses, giving consideration to prepayment speeds, float, and servicing advances. MSR fair value tends to move opposite to origination volume. For example, MSR values tend to increase in periods marked by low origination activity. Other key items to consider include any non-MSR intangible assets, proprietary technology, funding, relationships with originators and referral sources, and the existence of any excess equity.Market Approach Marketmethods include a variety of methods that compare the subject with transactions involving similar investments, including publicly traded guideline companies and sales involving controlling interests in public or private guideline companies. Historically, publicly traded pure-play mortgage companies were a rare breed; however, the COVID-19 mortgage boom has produced several IPOs, and others may follow. There are many publicly traded banks that derive significant revenues from mortgage operations, especially in this low-rate environment.The basic method utilized under the market approach is the guideline public company or guideline transactions method. The most commonly used version of the guideline company method develops a price/earnings (P/E) ratio with which to capitalize net income. If the public company group is sufficiently homogeneous with respect to the companies selected and their financial performance, an average or median P/E ratio may be calculated as representative of the group. Other activity-based valuation metrics for the mortgage industry include EBITDA, revenues, or originations.Another relevant indicator includes price/tangible book value as investors tend to treat tangible book value as a proxy for the institution’s earnings capabilities. The key to this method lies in finding comparable companies with a similar revenue mix (high fee income) and profitability.When examining the public markets, there are generally two types of companies that can be useful in gathering financial and valuation data: banks emphasizing mortgage activities and non-bank mortgage companies.Group 1: Banks with Mortgage Revenue EmphasisFigure 1 details the first step in identifying a group of banks with significant mortgage operations. First, financial data from the most recently available quarter (4Q20) regarding banks with assets between $1 billion and $20 billion were identified. Once that broad group of banks is identified, it is then important to segment the group further to identify those with significant gain on loan sales as a proportion of revenue and particularly those with higher than typical mortgage revenues/originations as opposed to SBA or PPP loan originations.Group 2: Non-Bank Mortgage CompaniesNon-bank mortgage companies found favor with the public markets in 2020 as beneficiaries of the sharp reduction in mortgage rates. In 2021 investor sentiment has faltered due to the impact of rising long-term rates on consensus earning estimates. Several companies undertook IPOs, while another company went public via merging with a SPAC. This expanded the group of non-bank mortgage companies from which to derive valuation multiples and benchmarking information. Figure 2 includes total return data for non-bank mortgage companies. Notable transactions include the following: Rocket Mortgage (NYSE: RKT) raised $1.8 billion via an IPO at an approximate $36 billion valuation in August; Guild Holdings (NASDAQ: GHLD) raised ~$98 million in a November IPO; United Wholesale Mortgage (NYSE: UWM) went public in the largest SPAC deal in history (~$16 billion) that closed in 2021; and Loan Depot (NYSE: LDI) went public during February by raising $54 million. Other pending IPOs based upon public S-1 filings include Caliber Home Loans and Better.com. Amerihome Mortgage Company had filed a registration statement but apparently obtained better pricing through an acquisition by Western Alliance Bancorp (NYSE: WAL) during February that was valued at ~ $1.0 billion at announcement, or about 1.4x the company’s tangible book value. While this activity is positive for mortgage companies, the IPOs were downsized in terms of the number of shares sold with pricing below the initial target range or at the low end of the range as investors hedged how far and how fast earnings could fall in a rising rate environment. For guideline M&A transactions, the data is often limited as there may only be a handful of transactions in a given year and even fewer with reported deal values and pricing multiples. However, meaningful data can sometimes be derived from announced transactions with transparent pricing and valuation metrics. After deriving the “core” earnings estimate for the mortgage company as well as reasonable valuation multiples, other key valuation elements to consider include: any excess equity, mortgage servicing rights, unique technology solutions that differentiate the company, origination mix (refi vs. purchase; retail vs. correspondent or wholesale), geographic footprint of originations/ locations, and risk profile of the balance sheet and originations (for example, agency vs. non-agency loans). Income ApproachValuation methods under the income approach include those methods that provide for the direct capitalization of earnings estimates, as well as valuation methods calling for the forecasting of future benefits (earnings or cash flows) and then discounting those benefits to the present at an appropriate discount rate. For banks, the discounted cash flow (“DCF”) method can be a useful indication of value due to the availability and reliability of bank forecast/capital plans. However, due to the volatile and unpredictable nature of mortgage earnings, this method faces challenges when applied to a mortgage company. In certain situations, the DCF method may not be utilized due to uncertainties regarding the earnings outlook. In others, the DCF method may be applied with the subject company’s level of mortgage origination activity tied to a forecast for overall industry originations and historical gain on sale margins.Given the potentially limited comparable company data and the difficulty associated with developing a long-term forecast for a DCF analysis, the single period income capitalization method may be useful.This method involves determining an ongoing level of earnings for the company, usually by estimating an ongoing level of mortgage origination activity and a pretax margin and capitalizing it with a “cap rate”. The cap rate is a function of a perpetual earnings growth rate and a discount rate that is correlated with the entity’s risk. Whereas we would likely use recent earnings in the market approach, in the income capitalization method it makes sense to normalize earnings using a longer-term average, which considers origination and margin levels over an entire mortgage operating cycle.Mortgage earnings and margins are cyclical. Due to the volatile nature of mortgage earnings, a higher discount rate is normally used. Therefore, a mortgage company’s earnings typically receive a lower multiple than a bank’s more stable earnings.ConclusionA mortgage subsidiary can be a beneficial tool for community banks to increase earnings and diversify revenue. This strategy, while clearly beneficial now, can be utilized throughout the business cycle. As rates fall and net interest income faces pressure, gains on the sale of loans should increase (and vice versa) to create counter-cyclical revenues. As we’ve discussed, the inherently volatile income from a mortgage subsidiary is not usually treated equally to net interest income in the public markets. Although, when it comes to price/tangible book value multiples, profitability is critical whether it is driven by mortgage activity or not. There are many factors to consider in valuing a mortgage company.If you are considering this line of business to diversify your bank or desire a valuation of a mortgage operation, feel free to reach out for further discussion.Originally appeared in Mercer Capital’s Bank Watch, February 2021.