Corporate Valuation, Investment Management

February 15, 2016

What’s Stopping Banks from Getting into Wealth Management and How to Overcome It

Final Thoughts on AOBA

In the mid-1960s, the Department of Transportation was considering banning the sale of convertibles in the U.S. because of safety concerns for occupants in the event of roll-overs. What we now know as the “sun-roof” became a popular response to this regulatory threat, but Porsche went one step further and developed a version of its popular 911 series that had a removable roof and a removable (plastic) rear window known as the “Targa”. Essentially, the Targa was a convertible with a cosmetically-integrated roll-bar, or a cross between a coupe and a convertible that provided the open-air experience of one with the (relative) safety of the other.

The DOT never actually banned the sale of convertibles in America, but Porsche pressed on and the potential for regulation spawned a response that, over time, became recognized as an iconic design. Other automakers quickly followed suit, and a trend was born. Porsche still offers the 911 in a Targa configuration, although the mechanism for removing the roof has become considerably more elaborate.

Do Regulations Suggest a New Model for Banking?

As discussed in last week’s blog, economic circumstances and technological change, to say nothing of Dodd-Frank, are forcing banks to reconsider their business models. For many, the opportunity in this lies in another piece of legislation: the repeal of Glass-Steagall. Much like Porsche discovered fifty years ago, many banks are responding to regulatory changes by opting for a hybrid model that pairs trust and wealth management operations with traditional banking. The advantages of banks developing their investment management operations are pretty easy to see: it produces a more stable and diverse revenue stream, it provides more touch points for customer relationships, and it can substantially improve a bank’s return on equity.

Some see this opportunity very clearly. Last year, I attended a reception at a successful trust bank and overheard a conversation between the CFO’s mother and a new employee at the bank, whom she told “we just used the lending function to pay bills until we could ramp up the wealth management practice.” I decided that evening that when a corporate executive’s relatives can express the strategic plan perfectly in twenty five words or less, it’s a good plan.

Of course, opportunity is a two way street, and banks looking to venture into investment management, especially by acquisition, typically encounter a couple of major obstacles: balance sheet dilution and culture clash. Both of these challenges arise from the main difference between traditional banking and asset management. Whereas banking is asset heavy and personnel light, asset management requires not much of a balance sheet, but plenty of expensive staffing. It’s a significant difference that can only be managed head on.

ROE > TBV

From the perspective of a typical money manager, banker obsession with tangible book value can seem without merit, particularly in an era where net interest margins are evaporating and pursuing return on assets can seem Quixotic. But at some level, banking is what it is, and without TBV to leverage, there’s no bank. For a bank with excess equity, even today it can look much more attractive to buy another bank instead of an RIA.

Despite our current era of low and declining NIMs, TBV dilution for an acquiring bank paying 50% more than tangible book can be earned back in three or four years, thanks to the opportunities for expense saves in the right merger. RIAs often transact for lower pre-tax multiples than banks, but the price to book multiples can be nearly incalculable. A wealth manager might sell for eight or nine times pre-tax net income (the real range is larger), but 90% of that transaction is ultimately allocable to intangible assets. There is little in the way of expense saves in combining, say, an existing wealth management firm with a bank’s trust operations. The earn-back period on tangible book dilution for an investment management acquisition can stretch to a decade, absent favorable markets or other growth catalysts, which is more than a lot of banks are willing to bear.

There’s plenty of reason to absorb the TBV dilution, though, and for banks to do RIA acquisitions anyway. Most banks are starved for ROE these days, and there’s no quicker path to improving ROE than trading some book value for the recurring earnings that only an asset management shop can provide. Bank mergers may be easier to digest financially on the front end, but after the dust settles, it’s just more bank, which doesn’t solve the problem of how to make money when the environment for banks is as negative as it is currently.

While the dilution to TBV can’t be avoided, some of the dilution can be mitigated (or at least justified), by paying for a substantial portion of the acquisition with a performance-based earn-out. It isn’t uncommon to pay one-third or more of the purchase price of an asset management firm acquisition using contingent considerations. While there’s still a down payment, or initial consideration, to be paid in an investment management firm acquisition, an earn-out consideration can at least allow the bank to experience part of the TBV diminution at the same time that earnings are being produced to justify the balance sheet impact.

This model works even better when the contingent consideration is paid as compensation (bonuses), so book value dilution is avoided altogether, and the acquirer gets the real time tax benefit of salary expense. Few selling investment managers are willing to agree to this because of the tax impact to them, but it’s a negotiating point worth remembering.

Managing (Accepting) Culture Clash

It’s not an exaggeration to say that investment management firms brag about how much they pay their people, and banks brag about how little they pay their people. The regulatory item that requires banks to disclose their average compensation – where lower is considered better – has never existed in the investment management community (where the material trappings of success were the ultimate performance ratio).

Banks acquiring asset management firms have to accept the fact that they can’t put a bunch of investment managers on a bank’s compensation plan without enduring value-killing turnover and customer attrition. An RIA’s business model is inescapably different than a bank, and the rigid work environment and salary structure that is endemic to banking simply won’t work in the investment management community.

This can make integrating an RIA acquisition into an existing trust operation especially challenging, and at some level there has to be acceptance on the front end that the wealth managers will probably make more than the lenders, but that their impact on the bank’s P&L will justify it. It isn’t unusual to see personnel costs in a well-run, mature RIA sum to half of revenue. The revenue and profit per employee of an RIA is simply much greater than the same metrics applied to a bank, and compensation is higher.

So while the mixture of Mazdas and Maseratis in the employee parking lot may be awkward at first, in the long run, a bank with a successful trust or wealth management franchise will provide growth opportunities and earnings stability that benefit all of a bank’s stakeholders.

Eyes Wide Open

It remains to be seen whether the either/or business model of banks with wealth management practices (or wealth management practices with banking operations – depending on your perspective) will endure like the Targa design of the 1960s. But the banking environment today demands something of a response, and developing a revenue stream from investment management offers banks a path to remain relevant and independent in spite of a lousy lending and regulatory environment. We just recommend bankers accept the challenges that come with RIA acquisitions and face them head on. In some regards, the issues of tangible book value dilution and culture clash stem from the very reason banks should be getting into investment management – a high margin, capital light financial service that is difficult to commoditize. In the end, the challenges of acquisition/integration are actually the sources of upside – so long as you’re willing to accept a little wind in your hair.

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March 2026 | Capital Allocation: The Strategic Decision in a Slower Growth Environment
Bank Watch: March 2026

Capital Allocation: The Strategic Decision in a Slower Growth Environment

Following several years of balance sheet volatility and margin pressure, the operating environment for banks improved in 2025 as most posted higher earnings on expanded net interest margins. The outlook for 2026, at least prior to the outbreak of the U.S./Israel-Iran war, reflects(ed) a relatively stable operating environment.Stability, however, introduces a different challenge. Loan growth has moderated across much of the industry, and the benefit from asset repricing has largely been realized. In this environment, earnings growth is less dependent on external tailwinds and more dependent on internal discipline. As a result, capital allocation has moved to the center of strategic decision-making.The Expanding Capital Allocation ToolkitCapital allocation discussions are often framed around dividends and, to a lesser extent, share repurchases. In practice, the range of capital deployment decisions is broader and more interconnected. Banks today are balancing:Organic balance sheet growthTechnology and infrastructure investmentDividendsShare repurchasesM&ABalance sheet repositioningRetained capital for flexibilityEach alternative carries different implications for risk, return, and long-term franchise value.Organic growth often is the preferred use for internally generated capital when the risk-adjusted returns exceed the cost of equity. However, competitive loan pricing and a tough environment to grow low cost deposits have narrowed spreads, reducing the margin for error. Similarly, technology investments may improve efficiency over time but require upfront capital with uncertain timing of returns.Returns, Valuation, and Market DisciplinePublic market valuations provide a useful lens for evaluating capital allocation decisions. As shown in Figure 1(on the next page), banks that generate higher returns on tangible common equity (ROTCE) tend to command higher price-to-tangible book value multiples. This can also be expressed algebraically, at least on paper, whereby P/E x ROTCE = P/TBV, while P/Es reflect investor assessments about growth and risk.This relationship reflects a straightforward principle: capital should be deployed where it earns returns in excess of the cost of equity. When internal opportunities meet that threshold, reinvestment should be appropriate. When returns are below the threshold, returning capital to shareholders through special dividends or repurchases may create greater per-share value.Share repurchases, in particular, can be an effective tool when executed below intrinsic value and when capital levels remain sufficient to support strategic flexibility. However, repurchases that do not improve per-share metrics or are offset by dilution from other sources may have limited impact.Figure 1: Publicly Traded Banks with Assets $1 to $5 BillionBalance Sheet Repositioning as Capital AllocationIn some cases, capital allocation decisions are embedded within the balance sheet itself. One example is securities portfolio repositioning.Many banks continue to hold securities originated during the low-rate environment of 2020 and 2021. While unrealized losses associated with these portfolios have moderated, the yield on these assets often remains well below current market rates.Repositioning the portfolio, by realizing losses and reinvesting at higher yields, represents a tradeoff between near-term capital impact and longer-term earnings improvement. In effect, this decision can be evaluated similarly to other capital deployment alternatives, with management weighing the upfront reduction in Tier 1 Capital against the expected lift to net interest income and returns over time.As with M&A, the concept of an “earnback period” can be applied. Institutions that approach repositioning with a clear understanding of the payback dynamics are better positioned to evaluate whether the strategy enhances long-term shareholder value. We offer the caveat that institutions who evaluate restructuring transactions should compare the expected return from realizing losses (i.e., reducing regulatory capital) with instead holding the securities and repurchasing shares. If the bank’s shares are sufficiently cheap, then it could make sense to continue to hold the underwater bonds until the shares rise sufficiently.M&A and Capital FlexibilityM&A remains a viable capital deployment option, particularly for institutions seeking scale or improved operating efficiency. However, transaction activity continues to be constrained by pricing discipline, tangible book value dilution, and investor expectations around earnback periods.Public market valuations ultimately serve as a governor on deal pricing, reinforcing the importance of aligning capital deployment decisions with shareholder return expectations.Conclusion: Discipline Drives OutcomesIn a slower growth environment, capital allocation is not a secondary consideration; it is a core driver of performance. While banks cannot control market multiples, they can control how capital is deployed across competing opportunities.Institutions that consistently allocate capital with a clear focus on risk-adjusted returns, strategic alignment, and per-share value creation are more likely to generate sustainable growth in earnings and tangible book value. In the current environment, disciplined execution may prove more valuable than more aggressive but less certain alternatives.
Evaluating Buyer Fit in Today’s RIA M&A Market
Evaluating Buyer Fit in Today’s RIA M&A Market
Buyer selection in the RIA M&A market is increasingly about fit, not just valuation. Strategy alignment, leadership depth, organic growth quality, and post-close integration all play a major role in determining whether a transaction creates lasting value.
From Great to Good? Koenigsegg, Ackman, and the Question of Going Public
From Great to Good? Koenigsegg, Ackman, and the Question of Going Public
As we’ve written many times in this blog, there is a puzzling disparity between the pricing of publicly traded investment management businesses and the valuations of RIA consolidators. This disparity raises many questions worth pondering – one of which is whether (or not) sponsor-backed consolidation models will ultimately be able to achieve liquidity via an IPO.

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