Financial Services

February 23, 2015

Recent Trends in the Fair Value of Community Bank Loan Portfolios

Although successful bank acquisitions largely hinge on deal execution and realizing expense synergies, properly assessing and pricing credit represents a primary deal risk. Additionally, the acquirer’s pro forma capital ratios are always important, but even more so in a heightened regulatory environment and merger approval process. Against this backdrop, merger-related accounting issues for bank acquirers have become increasingly important in recent years and the most significant fair value mark typically relates to the determination of the fair value of the loan portfolio.

Fair value is guided by ASC 820 and defines value as the price received/paid by market participants in orderly transactions. It is a process that involves a number of assumptions about market conditions, loan portfolio segment cash flows inclusive of assumptions related to expected credit losses, appropriate discount rates, and the like. To properly evaluate a target’s loan portfolio, the portfolio should be evaluated on its own merits, but markets do provide perspective on where the cycle is and how this compares to historical levels.

We reviewed fair values of recently announced community bank deals to determine if any trends emerged. As detailed in Figure 1, the fair value mark (i.e., the discount based on the estimated fair value compared to the reported gross loan balance) in recent deals appears to increase as the level of problem assets increases. However, the range remains quite wide and rarely hits the trendline, which could partially reflect the unique nature of isolated community bank loan portfolios. Overall, the median fair value mark observed was 3.30% while the median level of adjusted non-performing loans (as a percentage of loans) was 2.22%.

LoanPortfolioArticle_Wilson_Fig1Sources: Mercer Capital research, company SEC filings, company investor presentations

 

The recent fair value marks were generally below those reported in deals during (2008-2010) and immediately after the financial crisis (2010-2012). This trend reflects a number of factors including:

  • Stable to improving macro-economic trends. While contracting during the financial crisis, real GDP growth was relatively stable in 2013 and 2014 at approximately 2.20%. Real disposable income also increased 1.70% in 2014 after remaining relatively flat in 2013. Additionally, employment considerations have continued to improve in recent periods with the unemployment rate down to 5.7% in January of 2015 compared to 7.9% and 6.6% in January of 2013 and 2014, respectively.
  • Higher real estate collateral values. While the 20-city S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Index remains about 15% below its peak in mid-2006, it has increased about 25% since year-end 2011. Additionally, economic data from the Federal Reserve of St. Louis indicated that commercial real estate prices have been increasing year-over-year since year-end 2010 and were up 7.3% over the 12 months ended September 30, 2014.
  • Reduced levels of noncurrent loans. As detailed in Figure 2, credit migration continued to be positive and levels have declined to almost pre-financial crisis levels (third quarter 2014 levels approximated early 2008 levels).
 
LoanPortfolioArticle_Wilson_Fig2Source: FDIC

 

  • Reduced Credit Spreads. Credit spreads provide perspective on a number of factors, including where the credit cycle has been and where it is headed, as well as potential portfolio issues at a target when there are no apparent issues. While credit spreads did increase in mid-2014, they have generally declined since the financial crisis as economic conditions as well as investor sentiment have improved. For example, BB credit spreads have declined from 5.0% in January of 2012 to 3.5% in January of 2015. All else equal, reduced credit spreads serve to lower the discount rate applied to the expected cash flows for a target’s loan portfolio, thereby increasing the fair value of the loan portfolio.
Mercer Capital has provided a number of valuations for potential acquirers to assist with ascertaining the fair value of acquired loan portfolio. In addition to loan portfolio valuation services, we also provide acquirers with valuations of other financial assets and liabilities acquired in a bank transaction, including depositor intangible assets, time deposits, and trust preferred securities. Feel free to give us a call or email to discuss any valuation issues in confidence as you plan for a potential acquisition. Reprinted from Bank Watch February 2015.

Continue Reading

May 2026 | Revisiting Circle
Bank Watch: May 2026

Revisiting Circle

Ten months after Circle’s blockbuster IPO, the stablecoin landscape has matured from speculative enthusiasm into a more nuanced strategic reality for banks. While stablecoin adoption and transaction volumes continue to grow rapidly, the market’s evolution increasingly highlights a widening divide between large institutions positioned to participate in the ecosystem and community banks facing heightened deposit competition with fewer practical avenues for response.
Getting Into the Spirit of Valuation
Getting Into the Spirit of Valuation
When people talk about the “value” of a company, it is easy to assume there is one correct “answer.” In practice, there are many possible answers, and which one is the best answer depends on the purposes of the valuation, the user, and the facts and circumstances at hand. The Internal Revenue Service’s Revenue Ruling 59-60, defines fair market value “as the price at which the property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller when the former is not under any compulsion to buy and the latter is not under any compulsion to sell, both parties having reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts.” This is a great place to begin, but it is only the start.
April 2026 | The Community Bank Scale Tax: Three Questions for Boards in 2026
Bank Watch: April 2026

The Community Bank Scale Tax: Three Questions for Boards in 2026

Community banks came into 2026 in better shape than many expected. Margins and earnings improved, deposits were growing again, loan growth held up, and unrealized losses on securities moved lower. On the surface, the story looks better than a year ago. But that does not mean the pressure is gone.For many community banks, the next big issue is not only rates or loan growth. It is whether the bank is big enough, focused enough, and efficient enough to carry the higher cost of being a modern bank. That cost includes more than salaries and branches. It also includes technology, cybersecurity, vendor management, fraud tools, compliance, and the people needed to run it well. The FDIC’s Quarterly Banking Profile shows that despite better net interest margins, the largest drag on earnings is the cost of running a modern bank.That is where many board conversations should be headed now. The challenge is simple to describe: banking keeps getting more expensive, the cost base is harder to flex, and smaller banks do not always have enough scale to spread those costs out. This does not mean every bank needs to sell but it does mean every bank needs to be honest about what it costs to stay independent.1. Which costs are truly fixed, and which ones are self-inflicted?Every bank has unavoidable costs for non-revenue generating activities, such as for risk management, compliance, and cybersecurity. But not every cost deserves the same treatment.Some banks are carrying real fixed costs. Others are carrying years of built-up complexity: too many vendors, too many products, too many exceptions, too many legacy processes, and too many branches doing less work than they used to.The distinction between real fixed costs and the just-as-real complexity costs matters. If management treats every expense as untouchable, the bank usually ends up protecting complexity instead of protecting value. Boards should push on that point. Which costs are now part of the price of doing business? And which costs are there because nobody has made the harder cleanup decisions? Those are two very different problems.2. Are we big enough, or focused enough, to make the model work?Scale matters in banking, which is not a new point. The part that often gets missed is that scale does not always have to come from simply getting bigger. Scale can come from size. It can also come from focus.A bank with a strong niche, an efficient branch footprint, a manageable product set, and good expense discipline can often perform better than a larger bank carrying too much overhead. Bigger is not always better if the added size comes with added complexity.That is an important point for community bank boards. The question is not just, “Do we need to grow?” The better question is, “Do we have a business model that can carry the cost structure we have today?” If the answer is no, the bank has a few options: it can grow, it can simplify, it can narrow its focus, it can outsource more of what does not set it apart, or it can decide that another partner may be better positioned to carry the platform going forward.Recent examples show the range of choices. Community Bank used a branch purchase from Santander to build scale in a target market; Five Star Bank’s parent chose to wind down BaaS and refocus on its core franchise; Mechanics Bank exited indirect auto and later outsourced servicing of the run-off portfolio; and Susquehanna chose to partner with C&N for greater scale, resiliency, and efficiency. In sum, there are plenty of proven options and choices.But doing nothing is also a choice. And in many cases, it is the most expensive one.3. How much does the expense base hurt shareholder value?This is where strategy turns into valuation. A bank is not credited just for spending money on technology, compliance, or infrastructure. It gets credited when those investments lead to better performance, better returns, better customer retention, better growth, and better risk control.If the bank carries a heavy cost base without a clear payoff, that usually shows up in weaker earnings and lower returns. Over time, it can also show up in a lower valuation, which matters even if the board has no near-term interest in selling. Valuation is not just about a sale; it is a scorecard on the strength of the franchise. A bank with strong returns and a clear strategy usually has more flexibility. A bank with weaker returns and too much complexity usually has fewer options.Timing matters. Banks have more breathing room now than they did a few years ago when interest rates increased sharply, with strong earnings and clean asset quality, and that is a good time to revisit strategic and technological plans.The issue in 2026 is not simply whether a community bank can remain independent. The issue is whether it can earn that independence after paying the ever-growing cost of being a modern bank.The banks that will stand out are not necessarily the biggest banks. They are the ones that know what they do well, run a cleaner model, and make sure their cost base supports the franchise instead of weighing it down. For some institutions, that will support long-term independence. For others, it may lead to a different conclusion.Either way, the discussion should start with a hard look at the expense base. In a lot of cases, the pressure to sell does not begin with a buyer showing up. It begins when the math stops working.About Mercer CapitalMercer Capital is a nationally recognized valuation and advisory firm serving financial institutions including banks, credit unions, fintech companies, insurance companies, investment management firms, financial sponsors, and other specialty finance firms. Mercer Capital regularly assists these clients with significant corporate valuation requirements, transactional advisory services, and other strategic decisions.

Cart

Your cart is empty